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IN THE SWREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROBERT GRAY,

I

Plaintiff-Appellant,

1

Supreme Court Case No. 34666

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.,
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual;
GARY PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants-Respondents.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY

ERIK F. STIDHAM

JASON G. MURRAY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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'1 Judicial District Court -Ada County

User: CCLUNDMJ

ROA Report
Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal.

Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services lnc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson
Date

Code

User

12/2/2004

NEWC

CCCOLEMJ

New Case Filed

Cheri C. Copsey

CCCOLEMJ

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Judge

SMlS

CCCOLEMJ

Civil Complaint, More Than $1000, No Prior
Appearance
Summons Issued

SUBC

CCMONGKJ

Substitution Of Counsel (stidham For Gray)

Cheri C. Copsey

AFSV

CCEAUCCL

Affidavit Of Service And Summons (3/18105)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTD

CCCARUHA

Motion To Dismiss

LODG

CCCARUHA

Lodged Memo In Support Of Motion

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

CCEARLJD

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Civil Appearance, More Than $1000, No Prior
Appearance(p Olsson For Tri-way Co.)
Hearing Scheduled & Scheduiing Order
(0511612005) Cheri C. Copsey
Stip And Order Re: Scheduling

AFFD

CCTAYSSE

Affidavit Of Erik Stidham in Support Of M Dsm

Cheri C. Copsey

OPPO

CCSTACAK

Plaintiffs Opposition Tp Motion To Dismiss

Cheri C. Copsey

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Def's Reply Memo In Support Of Motn To Dismis Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCBLACJE

Plaintiffs Notice Of Lodgment In Support Of

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCBLACJE

Opposition To Motion To Dismiss

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCBLACJE

Affidavit Of Robert Gray

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Denying Mtn To Dismiss

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTS

CCEARLJD

Notice Of Telephonic Status (0711512005) Cheri
C. Copsey
Notice Of Service

Cheri C. Copsey

ANSW

CCCHILER

Answer To Cornplnt (p Olsson For Tri-way)

Cheri C. Copsey

STSC

CCDWONCP

Stipulation For Scheduling And Planning

Cheri C. Copsey

HRVC

CCGROSPS

Hearing Vacated

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTS

CCEARLJD

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

JTSC

CCGROSPS

NOTS

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Service
Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference
(0412712006) Cheri C. Copsey
Jury Trial Scheduled (0510812006) Cheri C.
Copsey
Notice Of Service

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion For Leave To File First Amended Compl

Cheri C. Copsey

LODG

CCAMESLC

Lodged Memo in Support Of Motion For Leave

NOTC

CCWATSCL

Notice of Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCWATSCL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/21/2006 04:OO
PM) Moton for Leave to File 1st Amended
Complaint

-

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

00003

Date: 1/24/2008

Fa

Time: 10:14 AM
Page 2 of 5

1 Judicial

District Court -Ada County

User: CCLUNDMJ

ROA Report
Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal.

Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson
Date

Code

User

HRVC

CCBOURPT

AMCO

CCBOURPT

ACCP

CCDWONCP

Acceptance Of Service (02/22/06)

Cheri C. Copsey

ANSW

CCSHAPML

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTD

CCWATSCL

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
and Counterclaim (Murray for Defendant)
Notice Of Taking Deposition

NOTC

CCWOODCL

LODG

CCWOODCL

NOTC

CCSHAPML

HRSC

CCSHAPML

NOTC

CCDWONCP

NOTC

CCAMESLC

LODG

CCEARLJD

HRHD

CCGROSPS

ORDR

DCANDEML

HRVC

CCGROSPS

HRVC

CCGROSPS

HRSC

CCGROSPS

HRSC

CCGROSPS

MOTN

CCYRAGMA

MEMO

CCYRAGMA

Memorandum in Support of Def Motion for
Summary Judgment

Cheri C. Fj@@)lr

AFFD

CCYRAGMA

Affidavit of Jason G Murray in Support of Def
Motion for Summary Judgment

Cheri C. Copsey

Judge
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/22/2006
Cheri C. Copsey
04:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Moton for Leave to
File 1st Amended Complaint
Amended Complaint Filed and Demand for Jury Cheri C. Copsey
Trial

Notice Of Motion & Motion To Strike Purusant To
Rules 12(F), 15(A) & 16(B), & MotionTo Dismiss
Pursuant To Rule 12(B)(6) & 8(A) By Robert
Gray
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike
Purusant To Rules 12(F), 15(A) & 16(B), &
Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Rule 12(8)(6) &
8(A) By Robert Gray
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
and Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (4/20/06 @
3:OOPM)
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2006 03:OO
PM)
Notice of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of
Robert Gray
Notice of Errata Re: Missing Page in PI. Memo in
Support of Motion to Strike and Motion to
Dismiss
Lodged Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike and Motion to Dismiss
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/20/2006
03:OO PM: Hearing Held
Order Denying Motion to Strike and Motion to
Dismiss
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/08/2006
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference held on
04/27/2006 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
10/19/2006 04:30 PM)
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/30/2006 09:00
AM)
Motion for Summary Judgment

-

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. C O ~ S ~ Y
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
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Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Sewices Inc, etal.

Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Sewices Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson
Date

Code

User

Judae

MOTN

CCYRAGMA

Motion for Summary Judgment

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

CCYRAGMA

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCYRAGMA

AFFD

CCYRAGMA

ANSW

CCWRIGRM

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

HRSC

CCMAXWSL

NOTC

CCGROSPS

NOTC

CCEARLJD

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Plnt Motion for
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Erik F Stidham in Support of Plnt's
Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Robert Gray in Support of Plnt Motion
for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Answer to Tri-Way Constructions
Services and Gary Petersons Counterclaim
Notice of Hearing on Motions for Summary
Judgment (Sept. 23,2006 @ 3:OOpm)
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 09/25/2006 03:OO PM)
Notice of hearing on Summary Judgment and
Scheduling order
Notice of Hearing on Motion for Summary
Judgment (9.25.06@3pm)
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Robert Gray

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Scott E. Randolph

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Jason G Murphy

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

RPLY

CCTEELAL

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

HRHD

CCGROSPS

NOTC

CCEARLJD

MlSC

CCWRIGRM

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

MEDl

CCGROSPS

HRSC

CCGROSPS

HRSC

CCGROSPS

HRVC

CCGROSPS

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Robert Grays Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of
Motion For Summary Judgment
Notice Of Sewice

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Cheri C. Copsey
held on 09/25/2006 03:OO PM: Hearing Held
Cheri C. Copsey
Notice of Change of Address
Stipulated Briefing Schedule re Statute of Frauds Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
Cheri C. Copsey
Mediation Ordered
Cheri C. Copsey
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/06/2007 04:30 PM)
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial Cheri C. Copsey
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0911712007 09:OO
AM)
Cheri C. Co@@O=
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
10/19/2006 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

-
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Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson
Date

Code

User

HRVC

CCGROSPS

MOTN

Judae

MCBIEHKJ

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/30/2006
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated
Motion to Continue Briefing Schedule

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Erik F Stidham

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCANDEML

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

CCTEELAL

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

STlP

CCBLACJE

Order on Motion to Continue Briefing Schedule
re: Statute of Frauds
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support
Of Motion For Summary Judgment RE Statute
Of Frauds
Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum re
Statute of Fraud
Stipulation of Counsel

NOHG

CCWATSCL

Notice of Telephonic Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCWATSCL

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
04/27/2007 OR30 AM)

Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Cheri C. Copsey

STlP

CCNAVATA

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
04/27/2007 08:30 AM: Hearing Held
Stipulation re: Completion of Briefing

CDIS

CCGROSPS

ORDR

CCGROSPS

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

MOTN

CCDWONCP

NOTC

CCDWONCP

HRSC

CCGROSPS

HRHD

CCHUNTAM

ORDR

DCANDEML

STlP

CCWRlGRM

ORDR

TCWEATJB

HRVC

TCWEATJB

HRVC

TCWEATJB

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Cheri C. Copsey
Tri Way
Order Denying in Part and Grating In Part Gray's Cheri C. Copsey
Motion for Summary Judgment
Cheri C. Copsey
Notice of Status Conference (7117107 @ 9 am)
Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/17/2007 09:OO
AM)
Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Order
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to
Tri-Way
Notice of Hearing (07/17/07 @ 9:00 AM)

-

Order Resetting Status Conference Hearing
Scheduled (Status 07/20/2007 01:OO PM)
Hearing result for Status held on 07/2012007
01:OO PM: Hearing Held
Order Clarifying June 5, 2007 Summary
Judgment Order & Correcting the Order
Stipulation for Dismissal of Counterclaim with
Prejudice
Order Granting Stipulation for Dismissal with
Prejudice
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
09/06/2007 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/17/2007
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. C@@b06
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Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson
Date

Code

User

Judge

911212007

JDMT

DCANDEML

Cheri C. Copsey
Civil Disposition entered for: Allrad, Ray,
Defendant; Peterson, Gary, Defendant; Peterson,
Kathy. Defendant; Tri-way Construction Services
Inc, Defendant; Gray, Robert, Plaintiff.
order date: 9110/2007
Judgment
Cheri C. Copsey

9/26/2007

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Motion for Attorney Fees

Cheri C. Copsey

MEMO

CCBOYIDR

Memorandum of Costs and Fees

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Cheri C. Copsey

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs
and Fees
Appealed To The Supreme Court

STlP

CCTHIEBJ

STlP

CCBLACJE

TCWEATJB

10/15/2007

10/2412007

Stipulation To Extend Deadline To Object To
Motion For Attorneys Fees
Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Object to
Motion for Atty Fees
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Motion for
Fees and Costs
Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Hearing
Scheduled 11/29/2007 09:30 AM)
Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham Re: Any Fees
Hearing
Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Re: Atty Fees
Hearing
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
11/29/2007 09:30 AM: Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

11/8/2007

HRSC

CCBLACJE

11/29/2007

AFFD

CCBLACJE

AFFD

CCBLACJE

HRHD

TCWEATJB

REQU

CCTHIEBJ

Respondents' Request For Additions To Record

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCTHIEBJ

Affidavit Of Jason G. Murray In Support Of
Request For Additions To Record

Cheri C. Copsey

12/21/2007

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Order Granting Costs and Attorney Fees

Cheri C. Copsey

1/18/2008

AMEN

CCTHIEBJ

Amended Notice Of Appeal

Cheri C. Copsey

12/10/2007

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

ORIGINAL
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Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83702-5958
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

v.
DEFENDANT TRI-WAY
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., a
Washington Corporation,
Defendant.

Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Plaintiff Gray"), by and through his attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP,
alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

At all times relevant hereto, Robert Gray was a resident of the State of Idaho,

County of Ada.
2.

Defendant, Defendant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., ("Defendant Tri-

Way") is, and was at all times mentioned herein, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Washington, with its principal place of business in Vancouver, Washington.
Nl
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

This Court has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

minimum of this Court.
4.

Venue is properly conferred on this Court as the actions which make up the

subject matter of this lawsuit took part in Ada County, Idaho.
5.

On information and belief, Defendant Tri-Way has transacted business within this

state as defined by LC. $ 5-514 and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

6.

Defendant Tri-Way purposefblly availed itself to this Court's jurisdiction by

initiating contact with Idaho resident Plaintiff Gray regarding employment. Defendant TriWay's recruiting efforts and negotiating efforts were directed at Plaintiff Gray while he resided
in Idaho. Among other contacts, Defendant Tri-Way directed contacts to Plaintiff Gray via
email, fax and telephone while Plaintiff Gray was a resident of Idaho. Defendant Tri-Way
conducted it business with Plaintiff Gray and within the State of Idaho for the purpose of
realizing pecuniary benefit and for the purpose of realizing, transacting, andlor enhancing
Defendant Tri-Way's business purposes and objectives. At all times relevant, Defendant TriWay knew that it was negotiating and contracting with an Idaho resident. Moreover, Defendant
Tri-Way initiated contact with Plaintiff Gray for the purpose of obtaining certain construction
contracts with Albertsons, Inc., a corporation with its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho
("Alhertsons Projects").

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7.

At all times mentioned herein Defendant Tri-Way was in the construction

business, managing and serving as general contractor for commercial construction projects.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 2
Boise.178856.1 0066060-00001

8.

In April, 2004, Plaintiff Gray and Defendant Tri-Way entered into negotiations

for the purpose of creating a contract of employment between said parties and for the purpose of
establishing an office in Phoenix, Arizona, and securing certain Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way.

9.

Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Defendant was to employ Plaintiff as

General Manager at Defendant Tri-Way, responsible for overseeing certain Defendant Tri-Way
construction projects. Defendant was to provide certain company resources, including but not
limited to, company employees, so that Plaintiff Gray could increase the net profits which he was
to share.
10.

Defendant was to compensate Plaintiff Gray at an escalating base salary as well as

at an annual amount equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts. In
addition, the contract provided that Plaintiff would be entitled to purchase an ownership interest
in Defendant Tri-Way at a set share price agreed to by the parties.

1I.

Relying upon this representation and their mutual agreement, Plaintiff resigned

his position at Albertsons, Inc., his former place of employment in Boise, Idaho to take
employment with Tri-Way. Under the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff Gray secured two
Albertsons Projects for Defendant Tri-Way, managed those projects successfully, and passed the
contractor licensing exam in Arizona, all for the benefit of Defendant Tri-Way. Without the
efforts of Plaintiff Gray, Defendant Tri-Way would not have secured the Albertsons Projects.
12.

On or about June 1,2004, Plaintiff moved to Arizona and began working for

Defendant according to the terms of the contract. Plaintiff Gray fulfilled all of his obligations
pursuant to the agreement between the parties.
13.

Defendant Tri-Way failed to satisfy its obligations under the agreement. On or

about September 1,2004, Defendant Tri-Way began attempting to renegotiate certain portions of
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its agreement with Plaintiff Gray. The new terms proposed by Defendant were substantially
different than the existing terms originally agreed upon by the parties. The new terms proposed
by Defendant adversely affected Plaintiff Gray, by and among other things, decreasing Plaintiff
Gray's wages and increasing the cost of Plaintiff Gray purchasing an ownership interest in
Defendant Tri-Way.
14.

Plaintiff Gray refused to accept the proposed modification to the agreement. On

or about October 22,2004, Defendant sent Plaintiff an email informing him that his employment
was terminated. Defendant Tri-Way failed to pay Plaintiff Gray in accordance with the
agreement and failed to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an ownership interest in Tri-Way at the
agreed upon price.
15.

As a d~rectand proximate result of the wrongful acts and omissions of Defendant

Tri-Way, Plaintiff has suffered significant economic damages, in excess of the jurisdictional
limit.
16.

At the time Defendant entered into the employment contract with Plaintiff

Defendant knew or should have known that the representations Defendant made concerning the
terms and conditions of said agreement were false. During negotiations, including but not
limited to discussions taking place in March 2004, on or about April 17,2004 and on or about
June 9,2004, Defendant Tri-Way, through Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson,
represented that Plaintiff Gray would receive 50% of certain profits and would be allowed to
purchase ownership in Tri-Way at a set price. Defendant Tri-Way made these representations
knowing that these representations were false. Defendant Tri-Way made these representations
for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff Gray to secure the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to
cause Plaintiff Gray to enter an employment contract with Tri-Way.
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17.

Defendant knowingly concealed facts from Plaintiff regarding the terms and

conditions of the parties' employment agreement and Defendant's plan to withdraw or modify
the terms of said agreement after Plaintiff Gray secured the Albertsons Projects and after
Plaintiff Gray took the position with Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendant Tri-Way never
intended to compensate Plaintiff Gray as promised. Defendant Tri-Way concealed this plan from
Plaintiff Gray until October 2004.
18.

At all times mentioned herein Defendant intended that Plaintiff rely upon

Defendant's representations and concealment of facts in order to induce Plaintiff Gray to secure
the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to induce Plaintiff Gray to work for Defendant.
19.

Plaintiff relied, to his detriment, on the false representations made by Defendant

Tri-Way and was induced to act by Tri-Way's concealment of facts. Plaintiff Gray's detriment
includes, but is not limited to, quitting his existing employment, taking employment with TriWay, and disrupting his residence and family in Boise, Idaho so that he could perform General
Manager services for Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona.
COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
20.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
21.

The terms of the employment agreement entered into by the parties, called for

Plaintiff to perform the duties of General Manager for Defendant Tri-Way and, in consideration
thereof, Defendant was to compensate Plaintiff according to the mutually agreed upon terms of
said contract. Plaintiff performed all duties owing Defendant under the subject employment
contract until Defendant breached this agreement.
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22.

Defendant failed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the contract.

Defendant's failure includes, but is not limited to, unilateral revocation and/or modification of
material terms of the contract, including failure to compensate Plaintiff according to the agreed
upon terms and failure to sell Plaintiff Gray shares of Defendant Tri-Way at the agreed upon
price.
23.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's knowing concealment of material

facts, its intention for Plaintiff to rely upbn Defendant's representations and concealment of facts
and its failure to perform its obligations pursuant to its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff Robert
Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT I1
STATUTORY CLAIM FOR WAGES
24.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
25.

Defendant Tri-Way has failed and/or refused to pay the amount owed to Plaintiff

for work pursuant to an agreement.
26.

Plaintiff Gray makes claim for all wages currently due and owing, attorney fees

and any other damages allowed under Idaho's wage claim statues, Idaho Code 9 45-601, et. seq.
27.

Plaintiff Gray also makes claim for prejudgment interest upon amounts owed

pursuant to his wage contract under Idaho Code 5 28-22-104.

COUNT 111
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
28.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
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29.

Defendant represented, and Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the parties' past

performance and representations concerning the terms of their employment agreement. By doing
so, Plaintiff suffered substantial economic detriment including, but not limited to, the loss of past
and future income, owing to him pursuant to the terms of the contract.
30.

Defendant foresaw or should have foreseen that Plaintiff would act in reliance

upon Defendant's past practices and on Defendant's representations and that, as a result of this
reliance, Plaintiff would suffer substantial economic detriment.
COUNT 1V
EOUITABLE ESTOPPEL
3 1.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
32.

Defendant falsely represented to Plaintiff and/or concealed from Plaintiff,

material facts essential to and part of, the terms of the parties' employment contract. Defendant
intended that said representations and concealed facts would be relied upon by Plaintiff all to
Plaintiffs economic detriment.

33.

Plaintiff was without knowledge of Defendant's misrepresentations and

concealment of material facts and thus, Plaintiffs performance of his employment obligations
was based upon Defendant's misrepresentations and concealment, all to his own prejudice. As a
result, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT V
FRAUD
34.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
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35.

Defendant made representations to and concealed information from Plaintiff

regarding the terms and conditions of the parties employment agreement.
36.

The representations made by Defendant were false.

37.

The representations made by Defendant were material.

38.

Defendant knew that such representations were false or were ignorant of the truth

of such representations.
39.

Defendant intended that such representations would be acted upon by Plaintiff.

40.

Plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of such representations.

41.

Plaintiff relied on the truth of such representations.

42.

Plaintiff had a right to rely on such representations.

43.

As a direct and proximate result of his reliance upon such representations,

Plaintiff suffered damages.

COUNT VI
DAMAGES
44.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
45.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct complained of herein,

Plaintiff has suffered the following damages:
a. Past and fkture loss of income, including income which Robert Gray ordinarily
would have received in merit and longevity wage increases and which would be
reasonably expected to be received in his normal career advancement with
Defendant Tri-Way.
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b. Past and future suffering of general damages, including but not limited to the
following:
i. Severe and irreparable injury to Plaintiff Gray's reputation and good
standing, both occupationally and with the public generally; and
ii. Costs associated with Plaintiff Gray taking steps to establish residency in

Arizona;
c. Past wages owing pursuant to his employment contract andlor the State of Idaho's
wage claim statutes;
d. For treble damages with respect to wages past due under Idaho Code (i 45-615 on
the basis that the wages have been fully earned by have been withheld willfully,
arbitrarily and without just cause;
e. Restitution damages, including but not limited to monies obtained by Tri-Way for
two Albertsons Projects wrongly obtained due to Tri-Way misrepresentations and
concealments to Plaintiff Gray;
f. Past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have
received;
g. Any further damages as may be proven;
h. Interest according to law, including prejudgment interest on all liquidated sums
allowable pursuant to Idaho Code (i 38-22-104;
i. Costs and attorneys' fees related to this suit under Idaho Code (i 12-120 and (i 12-

121 and other applicable statutes; and
j.

Any other and further relief that this Court considers proper.
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
As a consequence of the complaints, causes, and claims stated herein, Plaintiff has been
required to retain the law firm of Stoel Rives LLP, and has incurred and will incur costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees related thereto, for which Plaintiff is entitled to under Idaho Code $9
12-120 and 12-121,45-615,45-617,38-22-104, et. seq., and other comparable provisions of the
laws of United States or the State of Idaho.
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL IS HEREBY MADE.
DATED: December 2,2004.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Erik F. Stidham
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172
MOFFATT,
THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK&
FIELDS,CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
pmo@moffatt.com
jgm@moffatt.com
22-072
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named defendant, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc.
("Tri-Way"), by and through undersigned counsel, and for an Answer and response to plaintiffs
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial alleges as follows:

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against Tri-Way upon which relief may
be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Tri-Way denies each and every allegation of plaintiffs Complaint not herein
expressly and specifically admitted.

1.
Tri-Way admits paragraphs 2,7 and 9 of the Complaint.

11.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Tri-Way
admits only that the amount to which plaintiff claims he is entitled exceeds the minimum
jurisdictional limits of this Court. All other allegations or inferences contained in paragraph 3
are denied.

111.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Tri-Way
admits only that some communications between the parties occnrred while plaintiff was in Idaho,
and defendant knew plaintiff was, at times, living in Idaho. All other allegations or inferences in
paragraph 6 are denied.

IV.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 12 of the Complaint, TriWay admits only that on or about June 1,2004, plaintiff moved his residence to Arizona to begin
working for Tri-Way. All other allegations or inferences contained in paragraph 12 are denied.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 2

-

With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 14 of the Complaint, TriWay admits only that plaintiff refused to negotiate with respect to the terms and conditions of his
employment with Tri-Way. Defendant denies any remaining allegations or inferences, and
specifically denies that a final agreement had been reached which defendant then sought to
modify in any way. Defendant further expressly denies terminating plaintiffs employment, as
plaintiff resigned from Tri-Way.

VI.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Tri-Way
admits only that in or about April, 2004, it was engaged in discussions concerning the
employment of plaintiff with Tri-Way. All other allegations which may be construed as an
attempt to limit or otherwise define the scope or purpose of those discussions are hereby denied.

VII.
Defendant Tri-Way denies the allegations set forth at paragraphs 1,4-5, 10-11,
13, and 15-45 of the Complaint.

THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting the claims set forth in the
Complaint.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff failed to mitigate the amount of his damages. The damages claimed by
plaintiff could have been mitigated by due diligence on his part or by one acting under similar
circumstances. Plaintiffs failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of his recovery under the
Complaint.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 3
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FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions
complained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons..

SIXTH DEFENSE
The amounts plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits
must be reduced and offset by any amount that the plaintiff earned or could have earned, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, during the period for which lost earnings are sought by plaintiff.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
The actions and damages alleged within plaintiffs Complaint were proximately
caused, if at all, by plaintiffs own acts or omissions.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
Tri-Way has fully performed each term of the agreement between it and plaintiff,
and plaintiff has received the full consideration agreed upon, and that his employment with TriWay was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement.

NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff breached the employment agreement, if any, which existed between the
parties.

TENTH DEFENSE
That pursuant to Idaho Code, § 6-801, et seq., plaintiff is comparatively
responsible for the damages alleged in his Complaint.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required by
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 4

-

TWELFTH DEFENSE
That this Court has no jurisdiction over the defendant for the reason that Tri-Way
is a non-resident of Idaho and does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such
that exercisingjurisdiction over it would violate its right to Due Process.

CAVEAT
Tri-Way, by virtue of pleading a "defense" above, does not admit that said
defense is an "affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and does not thereby
assume a burden of proof not otherwise imposed upon it as a matter of law. In addition, in
asserting any of the above defenses, Tri-Way does not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or
damage, but, to the contrary, expressly denies the same.
WHEREFORE, Tri-Way prays that:
1.

Plaintiff takes nothing by his Complaint, and that the Complaint in this

action be dismissed, with prejudice;
2.

For its costs;

3.

For its attorney fees; and

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Tri-Way hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues.
DATED this 12th day of July, 2005.
MOFFATT,THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK &
FIELDS. CHARTERED

G. Murray - Of the P i m
Attorneys for defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of July, 2005, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Erik F. Stidham
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER,
P.A.
815 West Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601
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( 4 , s . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

.........
Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Curtis D. McKenzie, ISB #5591
GnEENER BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER
PA
815 W. Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 3 19-2600
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No.: CV OC 0409193D

Plaintiff,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAlNT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
'I'RI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Plaintiff Gray"), by and through its attorneys, Greener Banducci
Shoemaker P.A., alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

At all times relevant hereto, Robert Gray was a resident of the State of Idaho,

County of Ada.
7
-.

Defendant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., ("Defendant Tri-Way") is, and

was at all times mentioned herein, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Washington, with its principal place of business in Vancouver, Washington.
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3.

Defendant Ray Allrad ("Allrad") is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an

officer of and shareholder in Tri-Way. On information and belief, Allrad is an individual
residing in the State of Washington.
4.

Defendant Kathy Peterson is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an officer of

and shareholder in Tri-Way. On informatioll and belief, Kathy Peterson is an individual residing
in the State of Washington.

5.

Defendant Gary Peterson is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an officer of

and shareholder in Tri-Way. On information and belief, Gary Peterson is an individual residing
in the State of Washington.

6.

Defendants Tri-Way, Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson are collectively

referred to as "Defendants."

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.

This Court has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

minimum of this Court.
8.

Venue is properly conferred on this Court as the actions which make up the

subject matter of this lawsuit took part in Ada County, Idaho.

9.

011 information

and belief, Defendants have transacted business within this state

as defined by I.C. § 5-514 and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
10.

Defendants purposefully availed themselves to this Court's jurisdiction by

initiating contact with Idaho resident Plaintiff Gray regarding employment and regarding the sale
of Defendant Tri-Way. Defendants' recruiting efforts and negotiating efforts were directed at
Plaintiff Gray while he resided in Idaho. Among other contacts, Defendants directed contacts to
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAI. - Page 2
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Plaintiff Gray via email, fax and telephone while Plaintiff Gray was a resident of Idal~o.
Defendants conducted business with Plaintiff Gray and within the State of Idaho for the purpose
of realizing precuniary benefit and for the purpose of realizing, transacting, andlor enhancing
their business purposes and objectives and personal gain. At all times relevant, Defendants knew
that they were negotiating and contracting with an Idaho resident. Moreover, Defendants
initiated contact with Plaintiff Gray for the purpose of obtaining certain construction contracts
with Albertsons, Inc., a corporation with its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho
("Albertsons Projects").

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
11.

At all times mentioned herein Defendant Tri-Way was in the construction

business, managing and serving as general contractor for commercial construction projects.
12.

At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Allrad was an officer and shareholder in

Tri-Way.
13.

At all times herein, Defendant Kathy Peterson was an officer and shareholder in

Defendant Tri-Way.
14.

At all times herein, Defendant Gary Peterson was an officer and shareholder in

Defendant Tri-Way.
15.

In April, 2004, Plaintiff Gray and Defendants entered into negotiations for the

purpose of creating a contract of employment between said parties and for the purpose of
establishing an office in Phoenix, Arizona, and securing certain Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way
and to sell an interest in Tri-Way.
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16.

Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Defendant Tri-Way was to employ

Plaintiff as General Manager, responsible for overseeing certain construction projects.
Defendants were to provide certain company resources, including but not limited to, company
employees, so that Plaintiff Gray could increase the net profits which he was to share.
17.

Defendant Tri-Way was to compensate Plaintiff Gray at an escalating base salary

as well as at an annual amount equal to 50% of the net profit realized. In addition, the agreement
provided that Plaintiff would be entitled to purchase an ownership interest in Defendant Tri-Way
at a set share price previously agreed to by the parties. Defendants assured Plaintiff Gray that an
agreement was in place and that they would agree to have the term memorialized in a written
agreement after he was in Arizona.
18.

Defendants Peterson represented to Plaintiff Gray that he would be paid 50% of

the net profit realized. Defendants made these representations with the intent that Plaintiff Gray
would rely on the representations. At the time the representations were made, Defendants knew
the representations were untrue. Defendants never intended to act in accordance with these
representations.
19.

Relying upon Defendants' representations and their representation of a mutual

agreement, Plaintiff resigned his position at Albertsons, Inc., his former place of employment in
Boise, Idaho to take employment with Tri-Way. In reliance on Defendants' promises and/or
under the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff Gray secured two Albertsons Projects for Defendant
Tri-Way, managed those projects successfully, and passed the contractor licensing exam in
Arizona, all for the benefit of Defendants. Without the efforts of Plaintiff Gray, Defendant Tri.
Way would not have secured the Alhertso~lsProjects and Defendants would not have realized the
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
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financial benefits. Defendants profited from Plaintiff Gray's work on the Albertsons Projects
and from his work in Arizona.
20.

On or about June 1,2004, Plaintiff moved to Arizona and began working for

Defendant Tri-Way according to the terms of the agreement and pursuant to Defendants'
promises. Plaintiff Gray fulfilled all of his obligations pursuant to the agreement between the
parties. Plaintiff Gray relied on the promises made by Defendants when he took actions to his
detriment.
21.

Defendants failed to satisfy their obligations under the agreement. Defendants

failed to live up to the representations made to Plaintiff Gray.

011
or

about September 1, 2004,

Defendants began attempting to change certain portions of its agreement with Plaintiff Gray.
The new tenns proposed by Defendants were substantially different than the existing terms
originally agreed upon by the parties. The new terms proposed by Defendants adversely affected
Plaintiff Gray, by and among other things, decreasing Plaintiff Gray's wages and increasing the
cost of Plaintiff Gray purchasing an ownership interest in Defendant Tri-Way. Defendants
intended that these new terms were less advantageous to Plaintiff Gray and would damage
Plaintiff Gray. Defendants took these wrongful actions knowing that Plaintiff Gray had acted in
reliance on their previous representations.
22.

Plaintiff Gray refused to allow Defendants to make the proposed modifications to

the agreement. On or about October 22, 2004, Defendants sent Plaintiff an e-mail informing him
that his employment was terminated. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff in accordance with the
agreement and failed to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an ownership interest in Tri-Way at the
agreed upon price.
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23.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts and omissions of

Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered significant economic damages, in excess of the jurisdictional
limit.
24.

At the time Defendants entered into the employment contract and agreement to

purchase an interest in Tri-Way with Plaintiff, Defendants knew or should have known that the
representations they made concerning the tenns and conditions of said agreements were false.
During discussions, including but not limited to discussions taking place in March 2004, on or
about April 17,2004 and on or about June 9,2004 and in subsequent phone conversations,
Defendant Tri-Way, through Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, represented that
Plaintiff Gray would receive 50% of certain profits and would be allowed to purchase ownership
in Tri-Way at a set price. Defendants made these representations knowing that these
representations were false. Defendants made these representations for the purpose of inducing
Plaintiff Gray to secure the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to cause Plaintiff Gray to enter
an employment contract with Tri-Way. Defendants profited from the Albertsons Projects
secured by Plaintiff Gray.
25.

Defendants knowingly concealed facts from Plaintiff regarding the terms and

conditions of the parties' employment agreement and Defendants' plan to withdraw or modify
the tenns of said agreement after Plaintiff Gray secured the Albertsons Projects and after
Plaintiff Gray took the position with Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendants never intended to
compensate Plaintiff Gray as promised. Defendants never intended to sell Plaintiff Gray an
interest in Tri-Way according to the tenns discussed. Defendants concealed this plan from
Plaintiff Gray until October 2004.
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
66060-001 # I 50751

- Page 6

26.

At all times mentioned herein Defendants intended that Plaintiff rely upon

Defendants' representations and concealment of facts in order to induce Plaintiff Gray to secure
the Alberlsons Projects for Tri-Way and to induce Plaintiff Gray to work for the benefit of
Defendants.
27.

Plaintiff relied, to his detriment, on the false representations made by Defendants

and was induced to act by Defendants' concealment of facts. Plaintiff Gray's detriment includes,
but is not limited to, quitting his existing employment, taking employment with Tri-Way, and
disrupting his residence and family in Boise, Idaho so that he could perform Gelleral Manager
services for Defendants in Phoenix, Arizona

COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
(All Defendants)
28.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.

29.

The terms of the einployment agreement entered into by the parties, called for

Plaintiff to perform the duties of General Manager for Defendant Tri-Way and, in consideration
thereof, Defendants were to compensate Plaintiff according to the mutually agreed upon terms of
said contract and to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an interest in Tri-Way according to certain
terms. Plaintiff perfonned all duties owing Defendants under the subject employment contract
until Defendants breached this agreement.
30.

Defendants failed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the contract.

Defendants' failure includes, but is not limited to, unilateral revocation andlor modification of
material terms of the contract, including failure to compensate Plaintiff according to the agreed
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TlUAL - Page 7
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upon terms and failure to sell Plaintiff Gray shares of Defendant Tri-Way at the agreed upon
price.
3 1.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' knowing concealment of material

facts, its intention for Plaintiff to rely on Defendants' representations and concealment of facts
and its failure to perform its obligations pursuant to its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff Robert
Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT I1
QUASI-CONTRACTIIMPLIED IN-FACT CONTRACT
(All Defendants)
32.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
33.

Plaintiff Gray conferred a benefit on Defendants.

34.

Defendants appreciated the benefit given by Plaintiff Gray.

35.

Defendants accepted the benefit under circumstances that would make it

inequitable for Defendants to retain such benefits without payment to Plaintiff Gray of the value
thereof.

36.

The terms and existence of the contract were manifested by the conduct of the

Defendants and Plaintiff Gray and the request by Defendants and performed by Plaintiff Gray
can be inferred by their actions
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COUNT 111
STATUTORY CLAIM FOR WAGES
(Defendant Tri-Way)
37.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
38.

Defendant Tri-Way has failed andlor refused to pay the amount owed to Plaintiff

for his work pursuant to an agreement.
39.

Plaintiff Gray makes claim for all wages currently due and owing, attorney fees

and any other damages allowed under Idaho's wage claim statues, ldaho Code 5 45-601, el. seq.
and other applicable statutes and, in the alternative, the laws o f the States o f Washington and
Arizona.
40.

Plaintiff Gray also makes claim for prejudgment interest upon amounts owed

pursuant to his wage contact under ldaho Code 5 28-22-104 and other applicable statutes.
COUNT IV
PROMISORRY ESTOPPEL
(All Defendants)
41.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
42.

Defendants represented, and Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the parties' past

performance and representations concerning the terms o f their e~nploynentagreement. B y doing
so, Plaintiff suffered substantial economic detriment including, but not limited to, the loss o f past
and future income, owing to him pursuant to the tenns of the contract and the right to purchase
an interest in Tri-Way,
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43.

Defendants foresaw or should have foreseen that Plaintiff would act in reliance

upon Defendants' past practices and on Defendants' representations and that, as a result of this
reliance, Plaintiff would suffer substantial economic detriment.
44.

Plaintiff Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial

COUNT V
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
(All Defendants)
45.

Plaintiff hereby i~~corporates
and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
46.

Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff and/or concealed from Plaintiff,

material facts essential to and part of, the terms of the parties' employment contract. Defendants
intended that said representations and concealed facts would be relied upon by Plaintiff all to
Plaintiffs economic detriment.

47.

Plaintiff was without knowledge of Defendants' misrepresentations and

concealment of material facts and thus, Plaintiffs perfonnance of his employment obligations
was based upon Defendants' misrepresentations and concealme~~t,
all to his own prejudice. As a
result, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT V I
FRAUD
(A11 Defendants)
48.

Plaintiff hereby i~lcorporatesand realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page
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49.

Defendants made representations to and concealed information fiom Plaintiff

regarding the terms and conditions of the parties' employment agreement.
50.

Thc representations made by Defendants were false.

51.

The representations made by Defendants were material.

52.

Defendants knew that such representations were false or were ignorant of the truth

of such representations.
53.

Defendants intended that such representations would be acted upon by Plaintiff

54.

Plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of such representations

55.

Plaintiff relied on the truth of such representations.

56.

Plaintiffhad a right to rely on such representations,

57.

As a direct and proximate result of his reliance upon such representations,

Plaintiff suffered damages and Defendants wrongly benefited in an amount to be proven at trial

COUNT VII
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(All Defendants)
58.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
59.

Defendants and Plaintiff Gray were in a relationship of trust and confidence.

60.

Owing to their relationship of trust and confidence, Defendants owed Plaintiff

Gray, including but not limited to, a duty not to conceal or misrepresent material facts.

61.

Plaintiff Gray was damaged and Defendants benefited in amounts to be proven at

trial,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. - Page 11
66060-001 #I 50751

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants wrongful actions, Plaintiff suffered

62.

damages and Defendants wrongly benefited in an amount to be proven at trial

COUNT VIII
OUASI-ESTOPPEL
(All Defendants)
63.

Plaintiff hereby iilcorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

and incorporates the same by reference herein.
64.

Defendants have gained advantage for themselves.

65.

Defendants have produced a disadvantage to Plaintiff Gray.

66.

Defendants have induced Plaintiff Gray to change his position

67.

It would be unconscionable to allow Defendants to maintain a position which is

inconsistent with the position taken when Defendants induced and accepted the benefit
DAMAGES
(All Defendants)
Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph

68.

and incorporates the same by reference hcrein.
69.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct coinplaint of herein,

Plaiiitiff has suffered the following damages:
a. Past and future loss of income, including income which Robert Gray ordinarily
would have received in merit and longevity wage increases or which would be
reasonably expected to be received in his nonnal career advancement with
Defendant Tri-Way.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- Page
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b. Past and future suffering o f general damages, including but not limited to the
following:

i. Severe and irreparable injury to Plaintiff Gray's reputation and good
standing, booth occupationally and with the public generally; and
ii. Costs associated with Plaintiff Gray taking steps to establish residency in
Arizona;
c. Past wages owing pursuant to his employment contract andlor the State o f Idaho's
wage claim statutes;
d . For treble damages with respect to wages past due under Idaho Code 5 45-61 5 on

the basis that the wages have been fully earned by have been withheld willfully,
arbitrarily and without just cause;
e. Restitution damages, including but not limited to monies obtained by Tri-Way for
two Albertsons Projects wrongly obtained due to Tri-Way misreprese~itationsand
conceallnents to Plaintiff Gray;
f.

Past and future losses o f income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have
received;

g. Any future damages as may be proven;

h. Interest according to law, including prejudgment interest on all liquidated sums
allowable pursuant to Idaho Code 5 38-22-104;

i. Costs and attorneys' fees related to this suit under Idaho Code 5 12-120 and 5 12121 and other applicable statutes; and

j.

Any other and future relief that this Court considers proper.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
(All Defendants)
As a consequence of the complaints, causes, and claims stated herein, Plaintiff has been
required to retain the law firm of Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A.,and has incurred and will
incur costs and reasonable attorneys' fees related thereto, for which Plaintiff is entitled to under
Idaho Code §$ 12-120 and 12-121,45-615,45-617,38-22-104, et. seq., and other comparable
provisions of the laws of United States or the State of Idaho.
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL IS HEREBY MADE.
DATED: February 2 , 2 0 0 6 .
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER P.A.

Erik F. Stidham
Attorneys for Plaintiff

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR J U R Y TRIAL..- Page
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served the foregoing First Amended Complaint

Against Ray Alirad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson on the following named person(s) on
the date indicated below. in the manner indicated below:
Jason G. Murray, Esq.
MOFFATT
THOMASBARRETT
ROCK
&FIELDS,CHTD.
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, lothFloor
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829

[ f j U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[y]Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

-P
DATED this Jb day of February, 2006.

Erik F. Stidham
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172
MOPFATT,
THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK&
FI~LDS,
CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 1OthFloor
Post Office Box 829
Boise. Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
pmo@moffatt.com
jgm@moffatt.com
22-072
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff I
Counter-defendant,
VS.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TIUAL, AND
COUNTERCLAIM

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation, RAY
ALLRAD [sic], an individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual, GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendant I
Counterclaimants.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM - 1

I.

ANSWER

COMES NOW the above-named defendants, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc.
("Tri-Way"), Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson (collectively "defendants"), by and
through undersigned counsel, and for an Answer and response to plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint and Dcmand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complaint") allege as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon
which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation of plaintiffs Amended Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.
I.
Defendants admit paragraphs 2 though 5, 11 through 14 and 16 of the Amended
Complaint.
11.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 7 of the Amended
Complaint, defendants admit only that the amount to which plaintiff claims he is entitled exceeds
the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court. All other allegations or inferences contained in
paragraph 7 are denied.
111.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 10 of the Amended
Complaint, defendants admit only that some communications between the parties occurred while

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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plaintiff was in Idaho, and defendants knew plaintiff was, at times, living in Idaho. All other
allegations or inferences in paragraph 10 are denied.

IV.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 20 of the Amended
Complaint, defendants admit only that on or about June 1,2004, plaintiff moved his residence to
Arizona to begin working for defendant Tri-Way. All other allegations or inferences contained
in paragraph 20 are denied.

v.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 22 of the Amended
Complaint, defendants admit only that plaintiff refused to negotiate with respect to the terms and
conditions of his employment with defendant Tri-Way. Defendants deny any remaining
allegations or inferences, and specifically deny that a final agreement had been reached which
defendants then sought to modify in any way. Defendants further expressly deny terminating
plaintiffs employment, as plaintiff resigned from defendant Tri-Way on October 21,2004,
which resignation was to become effective on October 22,2004.

VI.
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 15 of the Amended
Complaint, defendants admit only that in or about April, 2004, defendant Tri-Way was engaged
in discussions concerning the employment of plaintiff. All other allegations which may be
construed as an attempt to limit or otherwise define the scope or purpose of those discussions are
hereby denied.

VII.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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Paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint merely sets forth a definition of the
parties to which no responsive pleading is required.

VIII.
Defendants deny the allegations set forth at paragraphs 1,8-9, 17-19,21, and 23-

69 of the Amended Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting the claims set forth in the
Amended Complaint.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff failed to mitigate the amount of his damages. The damages claimed by
plaintiff could have been mitigated by due diligence on his pad or by one acting under similar
circumstances. Plaintiffs failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of his recovery under the
Amended Complaint.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions
complained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons..
SIXTH DEFENSE
The amounts plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits
must be reduced and offset by any amount that the plaintiff earned or could have earned, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, during the period for which lost earnings are sought by plaintiff.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
The actions and damages alleged within plaintiffs Amended Complaint were
proximately caused, if at all, by plaintiffs own acts or omissions.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendants have fully performed each term of the agreement between them and
plaintiff, and plaintiff has received the full consideration agreed upon, and that his employment
with Tri-Way was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff breached the employment agreement, if any, which existed between the
parties.
TENTH DEFENSE
That pursuant to Idaho Code, § 6-801, et seq., plaintiff is comparatively
responsible for the damages alleged in his Amended Complaint.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required by
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
TWELFTH DEFENSE
That this Court has no jurisdiction over the defendant for the reason that
defendants are non-residents of Idaho and do not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum such that exercising jurisdiction over them would violate their right to Due Process.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
That plaintiffs conduct in inducing defendants to hire him as a district manager
for defendant Tri-Way at an agreed salary and with agreed benefits is such that it would be

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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unconscionable for him to now maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken
by defendants when plaintiff induced and accepted the benefit of that agreement.

CAVEAT
Defendants, by virtue of pleading a "defense" above, do not admit that said
defense is an "affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and do not thereby
assume a burden of proof not otherwise imposed upon them as a matter of law. In addition, in
asserting any of the above defenses, defendants do not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or
damage, but, to the contrary, expressly deny the same.

11.

COUNTERCLdAIM

COME NOW the above-named defendantslcounter-claimants Tri-Way
Construction Services, Inc., and Gary Peterson (collectively "defendantslcounter-claimants"), by
and through undersigned counsel, and for a cause of action against plaintifficounter-defendant
Rob Gray alleges as follows:
1.

Defendantslcounter-claimants incorporate by reference into this

Counterclaim the substance of paragraphs 2,5, 11, 14 and 16 of the First Amended Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial.
2.

Although the proposed employment contract submitted by counter-

defendant to counter-claimant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") was rejected,
Tri-Way nevertheless offered the counter-defendantan enlployment position at a salary of
$4,000.00 per month with employee medical benefits to begin effective his first day of
employment, June 1,2004. In addition, Mr. Gray was provided with a company truck to be used
for company business, and company credit cards to he used likewise. Pursuant to these terms,
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Mr. Gray was to serve as an employee of Tri-Way and act as the manager for the to-be-created
Phoenix division.
3.

As the division manager for Tri-Way, Rob Gray was to secure all

necessary state licenses in Arizona, secure suitable office space, hire necessary crews and/or
subcontractors, obtain work for the company, and to begin selling Tri-Way's services using TriWay's existing national vendor list. During the period of June 1,2004 through his resignation on
October 22,2004, counter-defendant failed to provide any of these services for Tri-Way.
4.

Shortly before plaintifflcounter-defendant'sresignation Erom Tri-Way, the

parties' relationship began to deteriorate. At or near this time, counter-claimants believe, and
based thereon assert, that Mr. Gray began to speak harmfully regarding his employer andlor Gary
Peterson to third persons and/or other outside entities, which communications harmed counterclaimants' business opportunities.
5.

Following Mr. Gray's resignation on October 22,2004, he was asked to

return certain company items which were necessary in order to close out certain job files,
including job files pertaining to the Tooele and Juanita projects. Mr. Gray failed andlor refused
to return those project files as requested, thereby requiring Tri-Way to expend a substantial
amount of time and effort "re-creating" the project files so that the jobs could be closed.
COUNT ONE
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
6.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 5 as though fully set forth herein.
7.

As a result of the employment relationship which existed between Mr.

Gray and Tri-Way, the expressed and implied promises made in connection with that

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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relationship, and the acts, conduct, and communications resulting in these implied promises,
there arose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by which counter-defendant
promised to act in good faith toward and deal fairly with Tri-Way.

8.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires, among other

things, that: each party in the relationship must act with good faith toward the other concerning
all matters related to the employment; each party in the relationship must act with fairness
toward the other concerning all matters related to the employment; neither party would take any
action to unfairly prevent the other from obtaining the full benefits of the employment
relationship; that each party would give the other's interests as much consideration as it would
give its own interests; and each party would refrain from any act which would prevent or impede
the other from receiving the full benefit of the employment agreement.

9.

Counter-defendant breached his implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing with regard to Tri-Way by refusing to provide the necessary licenses and by otherwise
refusing to perform those necessary duties and functions set forth in paragraph 3, supra, and by
failing to provide Tri-Way with necessary job files following his resignation from Tri-Way.

10.

Counter-defendant's conduct during the course of his employment with

Tri-Way was wrongful, in bad faith, and unfair, and therefore a violation of his legal duties.
1I.

Counter-defendant's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Tri-Way. As a direct and proximate
result of counter-defendant's conduct alleged in this Counterclaim, Tri-Way has suffered and
continues to suffer substantial losses and other benefits it would have received absent counterdefendant's acts in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court, the
exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
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COUNT TWO
(Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage)
12.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 11 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein.
13.

Counter-defendant Rob Gray knew he was employed by, and therefore

owed certain legal duties to, counter-claimant Tri-Way.
14.

Rob Gray, for personal reasons which were wrongful and for the purposes

of harming both Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and Gary Peterson, provided
unsubstantiated, inaccurate andlor defamatory information regarding counter-claimants to third
persons or entities, purposefully and with the intent to bring about harm to Tri-Way's
prospective business dealings.
15.

As a result of Mr. Gray's wrongful conduct, counterclaimants have been

injured and damaged in an amount which exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court
which shall be proven at trial.

COUNT THREE
(Defamation)
16.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein.
17.

Counter-defendant has published, orally, in writing or through his actions,

false statements concerning both Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., and Gary Peterson. These
statements have been published, communicated, conveyed and made known by counterdefendant to persons other than Mr. Peterson or entities other than Tri-Way and without privilege
to do so.
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FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM 9

-

18.

The statements communicated and published by counter-defendant

defamed Gary Peterson and Tri-Way and proximately caused counter-claimants' damages.
19.

The conduct and statements communicated and published by counter-

defendant defamed Tri-Way and Gary Peterson's character by imputing to them conduct or
characteristics incompatible with the proper exercise of their lawful business, trade and
profession. As such, the conduct and statements communicated and published by counterdefendant constitutes defamation per se.
20.

Counter-claimants have suffered harm from counter-defendant's

defamatory actions, including harm to personal and professional reputation and good name in
their communities, and difficulties in finding subsequent construction projects, all in amounts
which exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court and in an amount which will be
proven at trial.
COUNT FOUR
(Tortious Interference With Contract)
2 1.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein.
22.

Upon his separation from Tri-Way, Rob Gray was asked to retum a

number of job files, including project files pertaining to the Tooele and Juanita projects. Rob
Gray, for an improper purpose and without any good faith reason for so doing, refused to retum
those job files. The files wrongfully retained by Mr. Gray contained a number of documents or
other information which was essential to Tri-Way's ability to perform under certain contracts
andlor subcontracts.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM - 10

23.

As a result of Rob Gray's tortious interference with these contracts andlor

subcontracts, Tri-Way has been injured and damaged in an amount which will be proven at the
time of trial.

COUNT FIVE
(Conversion)
24.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 23 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein.
25.

Plaintifficounter-defendant's conduct in failing and/or refusing to return

the Tri-Way job files constituted an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over the personal andlor
business property of counter-claimants, which denied counter-claimants the exercise of their
rights over such property.
26.

As a result of plaintifffcounter-defendant's conversion of counter-

claimants' property, counterclaimants have been damaged in an amount which will be proven at
trial.

COUNT SIX
(Quasi-Estoppel)
27.

Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 26 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein.
28.

Because of his employment relationship with defendantslcounter-

claimaiits, courrteu-defendant has gained an advantage for himself

29.

Plaintiff/counter-defendant,through his conduct, placed

defe~~dantslcounter-claimants
at a disadvantage.
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30.

Plaintifucounter-defendantdeceitfully and for an improper purpose

induced defendantslcounter-claimants to change their position in reliance upon the employment
relationship to which the parties had agreed.
3 1.

It would be unconscionable to allow plaintifucounter-defendant to

maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken when he induced and accepted
the employment benefit from defendantslcounter-claimants.
WHEREFORE, defendantslcounterclaimants pray that:
1.

Plaintiff takes nothing by his First Amended Complaint, and that the First

Amended Complaint in this action be dismissed, with prejudice;
2.

For damages which counterclaimants have suffered and will continue to

suffer on account of plaintifflcounter-defendant's wrongful conduct described herein;
3.

For their costs;

4.

For their attorney fees; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendantslcounterclaimants hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues.

DATED this 10th day of March, 2006

Attorneys for ~efendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of March, 2006, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

i

Erik F. Stidham
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER,
P.A.
GREENER
815 West Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601

(\lfU.~.Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
Mail
( Facsimile

(F
&\G
as
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G. Murray

Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172
BARRETT,
ROCK&
MOFFATT,
THOMAS,
FIELDS,CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
pmo@moffatt.com
jgrn@moffatt.com
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

I

COME NOW the defendants, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc, Ray Allard,
Kathy Peterson, and Gary Peterson, through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules

L
,(~
,J
,.

\,.-

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

of Civil Procedure, move this Court for an order granting summary judgment in their favor
against plaintiff on all claims asserted in plaintiffs First Amended Complaint.
This motion is based on the pleadings on file herein, and the Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of Jason G. Murray, filed
contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2006.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of August, 2006, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Erik F. Stidham
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER,
P.A.
815 West Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601

( 6 , s . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

-
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wI\lult!nL

NO.
A
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b

Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Scott E. Randolph, ISB #6768
GREENERBANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER
PA
8 15 W. Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 3 19-2600
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No.: CV OC 0409193D

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLARD, an individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON. an individual,
Defendants.

Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

i

AND RELATED COUNTERC1,AIMS.
COMES NOW, the above named Plaintiff Robert Gray ("Gray"). by and through his
counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., and moves this Court pursuant to Rule 56
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary judgment against
Defendants Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and Gary Peterson on their counterclaims
against Gray.

I'I.AIN I IFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I'age
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This Motion is supported by pleadings previously filed with the Court, a Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Affidavits of Erik Stidham, Robert Gray and
Mark Sipiora, all filed concurrently herewith.
Oral A1gument is requested.
DATED: August$%O6.
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER
P.A.

-

Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below, in the manner
indicated below:
Jason G. Murray, Esq.
MOFFATT
THOMASBARRETT
ROCK
&FIELDS,CHTD.
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 1othFloor
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829
DATED this

3-r l day of August, 2006
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U.S.,Mail
Facs~mlle
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Scott E. Randolph, ISB it6768
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKERPA
8 15 W. Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 31 9-2600
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

I1

ROBERT GRAY,
Plaintiff,

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
WC., a Wasl~ingtonCorporation; RAY
ALLARD, an individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

Case No.: CV OC 0409193D
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO TRI-WAY
CONSTRUCTIONS SERVICES, INC. AND
GARY PETERSON'S COUNTERCLAIM

Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.
COMES NOW Plaintiff Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through its counsel of record,
Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., and hereby responds to Defendant Tri-Way Construction
Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") and Gary Peterson's ("Peterson") (collectively "Counterclaimants")
Counterclaim as follows:
1.

GENERAL DENIAL

Gray denies each and evcry allegation contained in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim not
herein spec~ficallyand expressly admitted. Gray reserves the right to amend t h ~ and
s any other
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO TR1-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES. INC. AN11 GARY PETERSON'S
COUNTERCLAIM -- Page 1
(66060-001 lr171Y23)

answer or denial stated herein once it has had an opportunity to complete discovery regarding the
allegations contained in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim.

11.

COUNTERCLAIM

1.

Gray admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the Counterclaim.

2.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim.

3.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Counterclai~n.

4.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim.

5.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim.

COUNT ONE
(Breach o f the Implied Covenant o f Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
6.

As to Paragraph 6 , Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein.

7.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim, except

Gray admits that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in each employment
relationship.

8.

Paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim contains legal conclusion and Gray neither

admits nor denies said paragraph,

9.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the Counterclaim.

10.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim.

11.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Counterclaim.

Ill
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COUNT TWO
(Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)
12.

As to Paragraph 12, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if filly set forth herein.
13.

As to Paragraph 13, Gray admits that he was an employee of Tri-Way.

14.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim.

15.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim.

COUNT THREE
(Defamation)
16.

As to Paragraph 16, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission andlor denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein.

17.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim.

18.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim.

19.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of the Counterclaim.

20.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 of the Couilterclaim

COUNT FOUR
(Tortious Interference with Contract)
2 1.

As to Paragraph 21, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if filly set forth herein
22.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim.

23.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim.

COUNT FIVE
(Conversion)
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24.

As to Paragraph 24, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission andlor denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein.
25.

Gray denies thc allegations contained in Paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim.

26.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim.

COUNT SIX
(Quasi-Estoppel)
27.

As to Paragraph 27, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial

in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein
28.

Gray denies the allegatio~lscontained in Paragraph 28 of the Counterclaim

29.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 of the Counterclaim.

30.

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim.

31 .

Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 1 of the Counterclaim.
111.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST DEFENSE

Counterclaimants' Counterclai~nfails to state a claim against Gray upon which relief may
be granted
SECOND DEFENSE
Gray demies each and every allegation of Counterclaimants' Counterclaim not herein
expressly and specifically denied
THIRD DEFENSE
Counterclaimants have waived and/or are estopped from asserting the claims set forth in
the Counterclaim.

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC. AND GARY PETERSON'S
COUNTERCLAIM - Page 4
(66060-001

#171923)

ooocl~

FOURTH DEFENSE
Counterclaimants failed to mitigate the amount of their damages. The damages claimed
by Counterclaiinants could have been mitigated by due diligence on their part or by any acting
under similar circuinstances. Counterclaimants' failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of their
recovery under the Counterclaim.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Counterclaimants' claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the action
coinplained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasorts.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The actions and damages alleged in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim were proximately
caused, if at all, by Counterclaimants' own acts or omissions.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Gray has fully performed each term of the agreement between the parties, and
Counterclaimants have received the full consideration ageed upon, and that Gray's employment
with Tri-Way was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Counterclaimants breached the employment agreement which existed between the
parties.
NINTH DEFENSE
That pursuant to Idaho Code 5 6-801, et seq., Counterclaimants are comparatively
responsible for the damages alleged in their Counterclaims
Ill
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TENTH DEFENSE
Counterclaimants have failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required
by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
That Counterclaimants' conduct in inducing Gray to be hired as a district manager for
Tri-Way at an agreed salary and with agreed benefits is such that it would be unconscio~lablefor
Counterclaimants to now maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken by
Counterclaimants when Counterclaimants induced and accepted the benefit of that agreement,
TWELFTH DEFENSE
Counterclaimants' claims are barred by applicable statute of limitations,

IV.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Gray prays:
1.

That Counterclaimants take nothing by their Counterclaims;

2.

For fees and costs; and

3.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: August 4,2006.
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKERP.A.

&'ink F. stidhamy
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOIJRTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff.

STIPULATED BRIEFING SCHEDULE
RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through undersigned counsel, and
hereby stipulate and agree to the following briefing schedule in response to the Court's request
for additional briefing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which briefing shall be
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limited to whether Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds. To that
end, the following schedule shall apply to this request for supplemental briefing:
Defendants' opening brief shall be due on or before Octoher 13,2006;
Plaintiff's response brief shall be due on or before Octoher 27,2006; and

.

Defendants' reply brief shall be due 011 or before November 3, 2006.

DATED this l $ a y

of October, 2006.

Attorneys for defendant

DATED this

day of October, 2006.
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER.
P.A

Erik F. ~ t i d h i r n C
Attorfiey for Plaintiff
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OF THE STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case-No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Following two separate extensions of time relative to the deadlines' set in the
parties' earlier Stipulated Briefing Schedule Re: Statute of Frauds, plaintiff filed his

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Frauds
on or about November 13,2006. In that memorandum, plaintiff provided nearly eight full pages
of "factual" arguments, most of which are either unsupported by any record evidence, or are
otherwise "supported" solely by plaintiffs affidavit "testimony." Since over two months have
now elapsed since oral argument was heard on the parties' motions for summary judgment,
however, it is worth noting that on September 25 the court established the parameters of the
supplemental statute of frauds briefing. The supplemental briefing was to address the limited
question of whether the statute of frauds applies to bar the enforceability of the alleged oral
agreement argued by plaintiff, the terms of which consisted exclusively of those terms contained
in the Draft Employment Agreement and the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock as they
existed on May 21, 2004.
Despite the clear limitation placed on the supplemental briefing, plaintiff has
devoted the vast majority of an eight-page "Statement of Facts" to alleged "terms" which he
describes as having been modified afler the May 21, 2004 meeting. Both the court and counsel
were abundantly clear at the September 25 bearing that the "terms" of the alleged oral agreement
were those that existed in the written Draft Employment Agreement which was presented by
plaintiff to the defendants at the May 21,2004 meeting in Vancouver, Washington. Plaintiffs
counsel so conceded, and the scope of this supplemental briefing was thus to be limited to those
"terms." Plaintiffs efforts to address any "changes" discussed at the May 21 meeting or at any
point thereafter, as well any statements of belief he has made regarding what the parties did or
did not agree to thereafter (to the extent that such statements differ from the written document as
it existed on May 21), are entirely inappropriate to this discussion. In fact, any discussion by
plaintiff concerning modifications, discussions related thereto, or other supposed representations

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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by any party to continuing negotiations after May 21, 2004 are beyond the allowable scope of
this supplemental briefing. As such the "factual" argument presented by plaintiff, beginning at
the second bulleted item on page 3 and continuing thereafter through the conclusion of the
"Statement of Facts," should not be considered by the Court.
It should be noted further that while the parties have been asked to submit
supplemental briefing on the limited issue of the statute of frauds, nothing in that analysis alters
the fact that under Idaho law, in order for there to be a binding contract (oral or otherwise), there
must be a complete meeting of the minds, and the overwhelming evidence of record
demonstrates that such is not the case here. Plaintiff has failed to submit any admissible
evidence that a final agreement had been reached, including any agreement with respect to the
bonus pay provisions which he claims are not subject to the statute of frauds. Accordingly, the
court does not need to reach the statute of frauds analysis in order to find that no valid or
enforceable "contract" exists. Nevertheless, defendant will address plaintiffs statute of frauds
arguments in turn.
11.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Statute of Frauds Issue Is Properly Before the Court.
Plaintiff first argues that defendants have somehow waived any defense based

upon the statute of frauds because they did not specifically raise it in the responsive pleadings.
See Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 9. The basis for plaintiffs argument is Rule 8(c);

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon his construction of that Rule, he adamantly
refuses to "consent to allowing Defendants to raise a new affirmative defense at this point in the
case." See id., pp. 9-10. Had plaintiff reviewed the annotated cases which follow Rule 8(c),
however, he would have immediately learned that the defense of the statute of frauds "can be

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
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raised for the first time in the summaryjudgment motion even though the [responsive pleading]
has been filed." See Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209,121 1 (1982).
This issue has come before the Idaho appellate courts several times, and both the Supreme Court
of Idaho and the Court of Appeals have held in favor of allowing the defense.
The Court of Appeals provided the basic analytical framework in the matter of

Good v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953,719 P.2d 1213 (Ct.App. 1986). There, the party seeking to
avoid application of the statute of frauds had argued that it could not be considered because the
opposing party "failed specifically to plead it." Good, 110 Idaho at 955. The Court then noted:
We acknowledge that a court is not obliged to consider the statute
if not pleaded. But it does not follow that the court is prohibited
from considering the statute. A court has the inherent power to
identify and to apply legal authorities germane to the controversy
presented. Hansen urges that Paloukos v. Intermountan Chevrolet
Co., 99 Idaho 740,588 P.2d 939 (1978), restricts this power.
However, Paloukos is a case where a statute of frauds was not
considered at all by the district court. The statute was mentioned
for the first time on appeal during oral argument. Our Supreme
Court simply observed that the statute had been raised "much too
late." Id. at 744,588 P.2d at 943. Paloukos does not govern
where, as here, the district court actually has considered and ruled
upon the statute.

Good, 110 Idaho at 955 (emphasis in original).
Several years earlier, the Supreme Court had sin~ilarlyupheld the trial court's
consideration of the statute of frauds, even though it had not been specifically pled. See

Bluestone, supra. There, the court addressed a line of reasoning that had begun in the federal
circuit courts of appeal. In summary, the federal courts had increasingly held that a party could
raise an affirmative defense during summary judgment proceedings only when that motion was
the "initial pleading" (is., a motion to dismiss which was subsequently treated as a motion for
summary judgment). The Idaho courts expressly rejected such a limitation, and held as follows:
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[Elven though it would have been better practice for the appellant
to have raised the affirmative defense in the reply to the
counterclaim or to have requested an amendment, we decline to
follow the federal circuit courts cited. The defendant knew of the
affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in
opposition to the defense. This case is unlike Paloukos where the
affirmative defense was not raised until the appeal to this Court.
Therefore, in light of I.R.C.P. l(a), which mandates that the rules
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding," we hold that where
the defense was raised before trial and the defendant was given
time topresent argument in opposition, the defense of statute of
frauds can be raised for the first time in the summary judgment
motion. . . .
Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 (emphasis added).
Here, as in Bluestone, the statute of frauds issue was raised by the court at the
summary judgment level. In fact, when the court raised the issue, counsel forplaintiff suggested
that additional briefing could be submitted to address the applicability of the statute. Defendant
did not object to this request, but the mere lack of an objection does not amount to "defendants
rais[ing] a new affirmative defense," despite plaintiffs claim. See Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum, pp. 9-10. Plaintiff instead clearly "consented" to the issue when his attorney
asked for an opportunity to submit additional briefing, and his argument that raising the defense
would be "unfair" is illusory at best. Given these facts, and the clearly controlling case law
provided above, plaintiffs argument that the statute of frauds defense has been waived is utterly
without merit.
B.

Plaintiff3 Reliance Upon Gomez v. Mastec Is Misplaced.
Plaintiff cites Gomez v. Mastec North America Inc., 2006 W L 36902 (D.Idaho

2006), and argues that even if the Draft Employment Agreement and the Draft Option to
Purchase Corporate Stock are themselves,subject to the statute of frauds, the "Incentive or Bonus
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Pay" provision should he separately enforced because that particular term could have been
performed within one year. Defendants first note that the Gomez case is an unreported opinion.
As such, that case is uncontrolling and of no precedential or even persuasive authority.
Furthermore, defendants submit that the very act of citing to such an unpublished opinion is
inappropriate, and the case should not be considered.
Even if the Gomez decision warranted further consideration, it seems clear that
the Idaho appellate courts would have (and arguably have) reached a different conclusion.
Plaintiff has attempted to distinguish Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, IZC.V .
Woods, 135 Idaho 485,20 P.3d 21 (Ct.App. 2001) from the facts of this case. Specifically, he

argues that the plaintiff in that case was attempting to "enforce a provision which related to a
number of years," whereas he is "simply bring[ing] a contract claim based upon the agreed upon
compensation terms as they relate to his employment of less than one year with Tri-Way." See
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 12. A closer reading of the Treasure Valley case
shows that the plaintiff there was seeking to enforce both a non-competition and a liquidated
damages provision. There is no indication, however, that the non-competition provision or the
liquidated damages clause would become enforceable against the defendant only after a specified
period of time. Instead, they were to apply "after the cessation of her employment with Treasure
Valley." See Treasure Valley, 135 Idaho at 488. Because there were no other limitations on the
provisions at issue they could have become enforceable within one year. Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals held that the entire contract was unenforceable, and did not selectively carve out any
exception to the statute of frauds simply because certain terms "could have" been completed in
less than one year. Instead, the Court of Appeals applied the statute of frauds uniformly vis-a-vis
the contract as a whole.
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Section 9-505(1), IDAHO
CODF,states only that "[aln agreement that by its terms
is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof' must be in writing. The statute
does not read "[aln agreement or anypart thereof," nor is there any controlling case law which
carves out such an exception. To take such a piecemeal approach to the statute of frauds would
be incompatible with other holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, the Idaho
Supreme Court established over forty years ago that "if anyportion of the proposed terms is
unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract." LeaveN & Co. v. Grafe &Associates, Inc.,
90 Idaho 502,512,414 P.2d 873 (1966) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in order to be
enforceable a contract must contain "all of the terms necessary," and an "acceptance of an offer,
to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or
introduce any new terms into the offer." Id. (emphasis added). Admittedly the Leavell case
dealt with issues of contract formation. Yet to now find plaintiffs proposed five-year
employment contract may have particular portions excluded from the writing requirement would
eviscerate the holding of Leavell and its progeny, which requires that the proposed terms to a
contract must be considered as a whole. Thus, the fact that a "portion of the proposed terms"
might be completed in less than one year does not alter the fact that the alleged contract must be
considered in its entirety, and the Idaho courts have yet to carve out the kind of exception argued
here.
Rather than being distinguishable as plaintiff suggests, the Treasure Valley case is
highly instructive in the present matter. Taken to its logical end, plaintiffs argument would
result in any alleged oral agreement being dissected to the point where a party engaging in good
faith negotiations could find himself or herself bound to terms they never intended, so long as
just one provision of the "contract" being negotiated could be performed within one year. If a
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party were allowed to pick and choose isolated provisions of an alleged oral agreement, which he
could later seek to enforce on an individual basis, the possible exceptions to the statute of frauds
would quickly swallow tho rule.
Finally, plaintiff incorrectly argues that the relief he is seeking is limited only to
"the agreed upon bonus structure for the time that he worked at Tri-Way." See Plaintiffs
Supplemental Memorandum, p. 10. According to the First Amended Complaint, he is seeking,
inter alia: "past and future loss of income," including income that he "would have received in

merit and longevity wage increases" (7 69(a)); "past and future suffering" (7 69(b)); "past and
future losses of income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have received" (7 69(f)); "any
future damages as may be proven" (7 69(g)); as well as attorney fees based upon the contract
claims he has continuously pursued (7 69(i)). He also continues to seek enforcement of the Draft
Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. Thus, the unenforceability of the entire Draft Employment
Agreement is still squarely at issue in this case, and both the statute of frauds and controlling
case law interpreting that statute preclude enforcement of any of the proposed terms.
Despite his efforts, plaintiff has failed to distinguish this case from the operative
facts and holding at issue in the Treasure Valley case. The fact remains that significant portions
of the Draft Employment Agreement were unsettled, and the contract in its entirety is
unenforceable. Because the Idaho courts have refused to carve out the limited exception urged
by plaintiff, and indeed have consistently held that proposed contractual terms must be analyzed
in the aggregate, there is no room for a piecemeal approach under the statute of frauds. Of
course, defendants have already established through prior briefing in support of their motion for
summary judgment that there has never been a sufficient meeting of the minds to support that a
valid contract for payment of bonus or incentive pay provisions was ever formed in the first
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place. The fact that those terms are also subject to the statute of frauds in this case is but a
secondary reason supporting entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor.
C.

The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Based on Part Performance Does Not
Apply to a Contract Which Comes Within the Statute of Frauds Because It
Cannot Be Performed Within One Year.
Finally, plaintiff has argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a defense

based upon the statute of frauds because there has been "part performance" by the parties. He
hrther argues that all of the "acts of performance are solely explainable by Gray's employment
agreement," and thus that performance is "explainable solely by the contract at issue." See
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 12. These arguments either ignore or fail to consider
the plain language of the controlling case law cited by defendants in their initial statute of frauds
briefing. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Idaho have held that "the doctrine
of part performance is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of frauds
because it cannot beperformed within one year." Treasure Valley, 135 Idaho at 489 (emphasis

added) (citing Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18,23,367 P.2d579 582 (1961)),,,~narrow "exception.
to the exception" thus has been expressly recognized by the Idaho courts in order to avoid
"nullification of the statute." Id. (quoting 49 Am.Jur. 798, Q: 497).
Because the equitable estoppel exception to the statute of frauds does not apply to
the May 21 Draft Employment Agreement in the first place, there is no need for the court to
consider whether the alleged performance is "consistent solely with the alleged contract."
111.

CONCLUSION

The issue now before the court is much simpler than plaintiff would suggest. The
court need not, and based upon the comments made during the September 25 hearing should not,
consider further the factual arguments plaintiff has presented in his supplemental briefing. First,

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS - 9

the facts set forth by plaintiff go well beyond the narrow issue on which supplemental briefing
was requested. Plaintiff had an opportunity to address the full spectrum of facts in his moving
papers, and his effort to supplement the factual record at this juncture is contrary to both the rules
and the scope of supplemental briefing prescribed by the court. In addition, plaintiffs
"statement of facts" is largely either unsupported or supported solely by his own self-serving
affidavit testimony.
Plaintiffs substantive arguments also carry little or no weight. The most
rudimentary search of Idaho law would have led plaintiff to conclude that the court is free to
raise the statute of frauds issue if it is "germane to the controversy presented." For him to further
argue that the statute of frauds should not be considered as an issue in this case is further belied
by the fact that he, and not defendants, requested the opportunity to submit additional briefing if
the court felt that it was appropriate. Similarly, plaintiffs supplemental memorandum has failed
to provide any authority contrary to the findings of the Treasure Valley court. There, the Court
of Appeals confirmed the long-standing rule that part performance does not apply when the basis
for applying the statute of frauds is due to the fact that the alleged contract cannot be performed
within one year. Finally, the Idaho appellate courts have never carved out the particular kind of
exception urged by plaintiff when an isolated term within an unenforceable contract may be
capable of performance within one year. Had the courts been so inclined, they presumably
would have done so in the Treasure Valley case, since the provisions which the plaintiff sought
to enforce in that case "could have" become applicable within one year. Instead, the appellate
courts have routinely applied the statute of frauds to the contract as a whole, and there is no
controlling authority which would support a finding that allows for a separate evaluation in the
manner urged by plaintiff.
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Defendants respectfully submit that the exceptions argued by plaintiff in his
supplemental briefing do not apply to the particular facts and circumstances of this case. The
statute of frauds clearly applies to the Draft Employment Agreement as it existed on May 21,
2004. Since the "terms" of that alleged agreement were never reduced to a final writing, they are
unenforceable. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to entry of summary judgment on plaintiffs
contract claims, including the claim for "compensation" based upon the unenforceable contract.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2006.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of November, 2006, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Erik F. Stidham
GREENER
BANDUCCI
SHOEMAKER,
P.A.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile (208) 319-2601

( ~ u . s .Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

1
2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ?

3
4

ROBERT GRAY,

5

Case No. CVOC 0409

Plaintiff,

6

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY

VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC.
Defendant.

On August 3, 2006, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") moved this Court to
13
14
15

grant summary judgment finding the parties never entered into an employment contract. Tri-Way
supported its Motion with affidavits and documents. Robert Gray opposed and filed supporting
affidavits. Tri-Way replied

1 I regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds to the employment agreement because by its terms II
18 11 the parlies contemplated a five year tern of employment. Both parties filed additional memoranda. /
The Court heard argument September 25, 2006, and sua sponte ordered further briefing

17

$9
20
2,

The C o w further ordered the parties into mediation.
I
/ / Mediation
failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation
1111 of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2001.
I

22
23

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Tri-Way's and Peterson's Motion for Summary
1111 Judgment.
I

24

BACKGROUND'

25

This dispute arises out of an alleged employment contract behveen Robert Gray and Tri-Way,

a Washington corporation.
II
27
26

Tri-Way is a general contractor building commercial construction

projects. In 2004, Tri-Way was expanding its operations into Arizona. Gray worked as a senior

28

29
30

'

These facts are undisputed. To the extent any facts are disputed, Gray's facts are considered true for the purposes of
?-Way's summary judgment only. To the extent Gray "argues" that his conclusion that an agreement had been reached
is a fact, thereby creating a material dispute, the Court disagrees. It is a legal conclusion.
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construction manager for Albertson's Inc. when he began negotiations for employment with Tri-Way
Construction in January 2004. Albertson's was going through a down-sizing and by 2002 had laid off
at least half of its construction managers. Gray had begun working for Albertsons in 1986.
Following a February 2004, meeting with Tri-Way, Gray retained counsel to prepare a written
agreement containing the proposed terms of his employment and a proposal whereby Gray would
buy out Peterson's interest. On March 10, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard at Tri-Way
that he would have his counsel prepare a proposed employment agreement. Gray testified in his
deposition that there was no agreement between the parties as to any material terms.
On March 16, 2004, Gray e-mailed an outline of his employment proposal to Tri-Way which
included a buy-out of Gary Peterson's interest in the Seattle-Portland business and a salary and bonus
plan. Gray proposed that Allard, Peterson and Gray each contribute $15,000 to a capital account to
provide start-up costs for the Arizona venture. Gray also proposed that the Arizona and SeattlePortland operations be tracked separately until 2008 when they would be combined. Under his
proposal, none of the parties would take dividends out of the retained earnings until 2009, and at that
time Gray's share would be 33% of the retained earnings.
For 2004, Gray proposed he would draw a minimal salary of $400 per week, and in 2005 he
would be paid $1 10,000 either as salary or draws. This amount would increase by 8% through 2008.
Gray proposed that as of January 1, 2009, he would become 50-50 partners in the Tri-Way SeattlePortland operation. However, he indicated he was open to suggestions. Gray testified that on or
about April 29,2004, he sent an e-mail to his accountant, Rob Grover, referencing partnership papers
that lie was having his attorney draft for a "corporation/partnership in Arizona."
On May 19, 2004, Gray e-mailed his initial DraftZ Employment Agreement, drafted by his
attorney. It proposed a term of employment of 5 years, beginning June 1,2004, and ending August
1, 2009, unless otherwise terminated as provided in the draft agreement. He also proposed that his
salary would be $4,000 per month until January 2005 when it would raise to $10,000. The draft also
included an annual bonus of 50% of the net profits before taxes of only the Arizona operation. This
draft differed significantly from the proposal Gray e-mailed Tri-Way on March 16, 2004. Peterson

!

The document is clearly labeled "Draft."
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acknowledged he received the e-mail with the draft proposal on May 19, 2004, at 10:31 in the
morning.
Gray testified that prior to May 21St,his attorney also generated what was labeled a Draft
Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. Gray testified that this document was discussed at the May 21S'
meeting. This document was clearly labeled a draft. In it, Gray agreed he would tender $5,000 to
the Petersons when the agreement was executed as consideration for the Petersons granting him the
option to purchase their stock. He testified he never tendered (or offered) the $5,000 to Peterson and
that no party ever signed the Option to Purchase. That draft agreement also proposed that Gray
would be entitled to exercise the option to purchase the Petersons' stock at "any time during the
period from April 1, 2009 through and including August 1, 2009," approximately five vears in the

future. Peterson testified neither nor his wife ever agreed to this option.
Subsequent to this draft, another draft was prepared. This new draft contained Gray's
handwritten notes. No party ever executed this draft. Gray testified that hesent e-mails to Peterson
and that in an e-mail dated July 27, 2004, he wrote: "I also hope to have the final draft of our
agreements with me, so we could possibly go over those and sign them, and I could hand you your
$5,000."
Gray quit his job at Albertson's May 1, 2004, before the parties met to discuss Gray's draft
agreement on May 21, 2004, and before Gray e-mailed his initial Draft Employment Agreement or
sent Peterson a copy of the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock.
The parties, Gary Allard, Gary Peterson, Peterson's wife and Gray, met on May 21, 2004.
Peterson testified at his deposition that Tri-Way (Allard, Peterson and his wife) told Gray they
rejected Gray's proposed employment agreement. Gray denies they told him that and testified in his
affidavit as follows:
As of May 21, 2004, I had an agreement regarding the substantial terms of my
employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including hut not limited to,
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership
interest in Tri-Way.
On May 21, 2004 during the meeting regarding my employment with Tri-Way, Gary
Peterson and Ray Allard gave me the impression that we had an agreement regarding
my option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tri-Way and regarding my
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compensation. Based on their conduct during the meeting, I believed that we had
reached an agreement3
-Iowever, subsequent to this May 21'' meeting, Gray acknowledges that another draft was prepared -3xhibit 7 to Gray's deposition. Gray acknowledged this draft was prepared

after the

May 21''

neeting. While the date it was actually prepared is unclear, Gray testified it obviously reflected a
ater version of the employment agreement because it contained a non-compete and non-disclosure
:lause discussed at the May 21, 2004, meeting; his draft did not contain these items. Therefore, he
estified it must have been prepared

afler the

May 21, 2004, meeting. Gray also testified the

>andwittenchanges to Exhibit 7 were his, and he further testified that Exhibit 7 was not the same
locument used at the May 21,2004, meeting. His handwritten changes reflect si~nificantchanges to
;alary and the bonus pay provisions.
Gray began working for Tri-Way on June 1, 2004, opening its Arizona office, even though
rdmittedly no par& had signed aw em~lovmentor buy-out a~reement. After he began working,
3ray and Tri-Way continued to negotiate his employment contract and the buy-out agreement4
Tri-Way's attorneys prepared another version, (labeled "Ver. 1 6/04/04" at the top) reflecting
;ome of the things discussed at the May 21'' meeting. This version was dated three days after Gray
legan working and modified his proposed salary, reducing the 2005 salary to $8,000 per month and
~ro-ratingthe proposed incentive or bonus pay. This version is clearly a draft because it contained
yped italicized remarks inserted in the middle of text - most significantly -- text directly addressing
:ompensation and bonuses. For example, in Article 4, which addressed compensation and incentive
)r bonus pay, this draft contained the following language inserted in the middle of the text:
Section 4.2. Performance Based Salary. . . . * this section is too confusing? . . . .
*computed when-each month at the end of iheJirst year?
'eterson testified he rejected this version.
Gray testified that this version reflected some of the things discussed in the May 21Stmeeting,
)ut he did not believe it accurately reflected e v e d i n g discussed in the meeting. In fact,
These two statements represent Gray's conclusions that he had an agreement and represent his perceptions. They are
actual statements.
While Gray disputes there were continued "negotiations," his own exhibits clearly demonstrate that the agreement
ontinued to evolve over a period of time subsequent to his beginning employment and that the parties continued to
liscuss the important provisions regarding compensation.
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estified he wanted the non-compete to be changed. Likewise, Gray testified that he recalled
eceiving a subsequent version labeled "Ver.2 6110.04" at the top. Gray testified that this June 10,
,004, version contained changes Gray suggested, and his handwritten notes on this version suggests
'urther changes. Like the previous version, it also contained twed italicized remarks inserted in the
niddle of text expressing continued concerns about the language in the compensation and bonus
iection, among other things.
Gray claims that there were no further discussions about the employment agreement beyond
rune 22, 2004, twenty-two days after he began working for Tri-Way and testified as follows:

I believe they were completed and there were no discussions necessary at this
A.
point.

Q.

And why do you say that?

Because of the discussions that took place on May 21'' and final drafts were
executed between June 1'' and June 10"

A.

Q.
A.

When you say "final drafts were executed," what do you mean by "executed"?

Q.

Prepared?

A.

Prepared.

Q.

Okay. ~evised?'

A.

Correct.

I meantyped.

Okay. And yet none of those revised agreements were signed by any party at
Q.
any time, correct?
A.

Correct.

On July 27,2004, approximatel~6 weeks after he began working, Gray e-mailed Peterson, in
elevant part, as follows:

I also hope to have the final draft of our agreements with me, so we could possibly go
over those and sign them, and I could hand you your $5,000.
The parties continued to modify and discuss the salary and bonus provisions throughout September
!004, as well as, the proposed buy-out agreement. During this period, the parties had numerous
onversations negotiating the employment agreement terms. Peterson testified that the Arizona

Neither party introduced any evidence of a "final" version that contained no italicized comments clearly suggesting
ontinued concerns about the versions.
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ivision would not effectively be run if 50 percent of its net profits were being taken out in cash and
iven to Gray. These concerns caused Peterson to have his attorney to make further revisions to the
~mpensationprovision in the employment agreement -- Article 4.
Gray testified that around September 1,2004, Tri-Way began attempting to change portions
f the "agreement." On September 13, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard, in relevant
art, as follows:

I understand from our conversation that if AZ profit for the year was $300,000 for
example, and $184,000 after taxes, your proposal was to have me take 50% of the
$184,000, or $92,000, as my annual bonus. Of the remaining $92,000, % was going
to go to the company as retained earnings, and % was going to go to a separate escrow
account, which would fund the buyout (or a portion thereof) in 4 years as a dividend
payout to Gary [Peterson]. This agreement you sent me betow doesn't say that. It
says '/z of my 50% bonus would go to the escrow account each year. Which defeats
the purpose of having the option to buy stock agreement, and would be unacceptable
to me anyway. If you can have this revised to read the way it was discussed, I'll pass
it on to my CPA for review and get back to both of you. If I misunderstood our
discussion, please let me know.
'eterson responded by e-mail as follows:
Rob
Think about what you are asking. You want Ray and I to buy me out in 4 % years and
give you half of the company!
The 50% after taxes that is for the owners will stay in retained earnings as cash flow.
Your 50% as we discussed will be divided with '/z in cash bonus to you and the other
half to remain in the company as a separate account to use as the purchase agreement.
Any questions -Please respond.
Gary
fn October 2,2004, Gray sent another proposal to Ray Allard and indicated this was a "last gasp" to
try and put this deal together." Gray gave Tri-Way until October 25, 2004, to agree to his terms.
)ctober 20, 2004, he returned the company credit cards and on October 21, 2004, he e-mailed Ray
illard, as follows:
As I mentioned in our conversation earlier today [October 21,20041, I'd like to make
next Friday my last day with Tri Way. . . .
I will not seek reimbursement from Tri Way for those costs I incurred in Attorney and
CPA fees as we tried to draft our agreements over the last 6 months, even though they
are substantial. As is the earnest money deposit I'll be walking away from on the
jRDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY
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house here in Phoenix. As is the amount of depleted retirement savings. Buy [sic]
hey, like I said, I'm a big boy and I put myself into this nightmare, I'll have to dig
myself (and my family) out of it.

I would hope that whatever portion of the profits I generated for Tri Way over the last
4 months that you and Gary feel I'm entitled to could be paid to me by November 1''.
5 //(Emphasisadded.) October 26,2004, Gray again e-mailed Ray Allard and Peterson in relevant part

i

Gary,
Just wanted to thank you for the opportunity to trv to out this 'deal' tovether over the
last few months. . . .
Let me try to explain: The last two weeks were not good ones for me. After 5 or 6
months of effort, I have to admit that our failure to out this deal together. . .
(Emphasis added.)

Gray testified he "refused to allow" Tri-Way to make the proposed

"modifications" and that on or about October 22,2004, Tri-Way emailed Gray terminating him.
Peterson testified that Gray gave Tri-Way an October 25,2004, deadline to respond to Gray's
14

final offer. However, according to Tri-Way, at some point prior to October 20, 2004, Gray returned

15

all the corporate credit cards and on October 21,2004, Gray tendered his resignation. Gray does not

1 I dispute that he returned all the corporate credit cards. He claims, however, he was terminated by Tri- /
j

j

17
18

way.
According to Tri-Way, it paid Gray the agreed-upon salary for the work he had done so far
//and offered him a bonus of $60,000. Gray brought two projects to Tri-Way - generating gross

I

20

revenues of $960,000 and $215,000. Kathy Peterson testified that the Arizona division generated

21

$271,792.48 in net profits from June 2004 to September 30,2004.

22
23

24
25
26
I

27
28

I

29
30
31
23

Gray testified that Tri-Way misrepresented and concealed certain facts which form the basis
of the cause of his action for fraud and upon which he claims he relied. He testified Tri-Way
represented to him that he could purchase Gary Peterson's interest in Tri-Way for a certain amount.
For example, he testified he was unaware that Kathy Peterson owned a 25% interest in Tri-Way,
until the May 21'' meeting or that she was unwilling to sell her shares. However, in his deposition,
Gray testified that he never had any discussions with her about her willingness to sell her shares and
no one ever communicated to him that she was unwilling.

Gray also testified that Tri-Way

represented it would compensate him "at an escalating base salary as well as at an annual amount
equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts [Tri-Way]." Gray asserts that
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY
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I

1 because of the representations made regarding these terms, he quit his job at Albertson's and
2 accepted employment with Tri-Way.
3
Gray brought suit alleging breach of contract, a statutory claim for wages, promissory
4 estoppel, equitable estoppel, and fraud. Relevant to this Motion for Summary Judgment, Gray secks
5 "past and future" loss of income, including income that he "would have received in merit and
6 longevity wage increases," and "past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would

11

/ / ordinarily have received."

He also seeks enforcement of the "Draft Option to Purchase Corporate

Stock."

9

Tri-Way moves for summary judgment and asks the Court to dismiss all Gray's claims with
prejudice. Gray also moves for summary judgment and asks the Court to dismiss Tri-Way's and
Peterson's counterclaims.

12

ANALYSIS

13
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is
l4 "rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
15 .
dany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

16
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 5 56(c); See also First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v.
17

Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790,964 P.2d 654,657 (1998). A party against whom summary judgment

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and
produce admissible evidence to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine
issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman

Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d
1224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial
court in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
On causes of action to be tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to
the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & MFarms

v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v.

28 Meridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are
29 liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v.
30

Coffin,113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
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1
2

The existence of disputed facts, however, will not defeat summary judgment when the non-

1 Imoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 1

3

its case. Garzee v. Barclay, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct.App. 1992).

4

Moreover, disputes of material facts are not created by mere conclusory statements. Hecla

5

Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 786, 839 P.2d 1192, 1200 (1992). The

6

requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, or

7

not supported by personal knowledge. See also Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U S A . , 126 Idaho
162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994); Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-10

11

(1992). Only material contained in affidavits or depositions that is based upon personal knowledge
or that is admissible at trial will be considered by the Court. Id Conclusory assertions, in the face of

I

the facts, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Farm Credit Bank of
l2 Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1994) (citing Hecla Mining Co.,

11

l3 122 Idaho at 786, 839 P.2d at 1200)
14
The admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in
15
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying
16
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is sufficient
17
to create a genuine issue for trial. Hecla Mining Co., 122 Idaho at 794, 839 P.2d at 1198 ( "[tlhe
18
question of admissibility is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal
19
construction and reasonable inferences rule to the admissible evidence."); see also State v. Shama
20
Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995). Therefore, Gray's
21
"conclusions" that he had an agreement or that he had the impression he had an agreement alone do
22
not create a material dispute of fact, especially in the face of the overwhelming evidence the parties
23
simply did not have an agreement, including Gray's own evidence.
24
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO ALL THE TERMS OF THESE
I.
25
CONTRACTS.
26
27
28

29

?',

1

11 There is no evidence that the parties ever had a meeting of the minds as to either agreement. 1
11 A valid contract requires a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the terms of the contract. I
Leave11 & Co. v. Grafe &Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 512 (1966). Accordingly, to be effective,
an acceptance
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3

must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce
any new terms into the offer. An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer
is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in turn be accepted
by the offeror in order to constitute a binding contract.

4

Id. In this case, the parties continued to introduce new terms and to modify the language of the

1
2

1I
11
7

5 proposed agreements and never finalized any agreement.

8

In particular with respect to the employment agreement, they continued to discuss the very

II

term central to this lawsuit - compensation. Even the last written draft labeled "Ver. 1 6110104" was
not final. It contained italicized comments in the compensation section -- like "this section is too

/I confusing" and "computed when - each month at the end of the first year?" In fact, Gray himself I
11 conceded he wanted the section regarding the non-compete changed. This was after the May 21St I

11

l2

meeting where he testified he had concluded they had an agreement. Clearly, they did not have an

I

agreement and his conclusion, unsupported by admissible facts, does not create a material dispute of
fact, sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Hecla Mining Co., 122 Idaho at 794,839 P.2d at 1198.

14

The general rules for the formation of a binding contract are well established in Idaho. In C.

11 If Leave11

I

& Co. , the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated these general rules as follows:

'In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct understanding common to
both parties. The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its terms, and, ifhg~!
portion of the proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract. 9
Cyc. 245. An offer to enter into a contractual relation must be so complete that upon
acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the terms necessary to
determine whether the contract has been performed or not. 1 PAGEON CONTRACTS,
sec. 27; 9 Cyc. 248. An acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with
the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into the
offer. 1 PAGEON CONTRACTS,
sec. 45; 9 Cyc. 267. An acceptance which varies from
the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which
must in turn be accepted by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract.

11 C. H Leavell Co. v. Grajk Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 51 1-12, 414 P.2d 873, -(1966) 1
2 5 11 (quoting Phelps v. Good, 15 Idaho 76,84,96 P. 216,218 (1908)) (Emphasis added). In other words, I
26 11 if Gray cannot establish that the most important term - compensation - was settled in any way I
27 1 I there is no enforceable contract. In this case, other than Gray's conclusory statement that they had an 1
28 1 agreement, there is no evidence to support his conclusion that the parties had actually agreed on all 1
29 1 1 the terms of employment, especially compensation including a bonus, and there is no evidence they I
24

&

&

-

13
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greed on the option to purchase. In fact, his own testimony and evidence is that they continued to
iscuss and negotiate the terms of both contracts.
Gray has the burden of proof to prove each contract's existence and its enforceability.

ohnson v. Albert, 67 Idaho 44, 170 P.2d 403 (1946). Thus, Gray must show a contract was formed
hrough mutual assent. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 696, 838 P.2d 293, 299 (1992). A distinct
nderstanding common to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist. Mitchell v

liqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978)(citing Brothers v Arave, 67 Idaho 171,
74 P.2d 202 (1946)).
Furthermore, in this case, it appears the parties intended to reduce any agreements to writing
n order to make them enforceable. Whether a contract exists when contracting parties agree to

educe their agreement to writing, is a question of the parties' intent. Id. See also, Thompson, 122
daho at 696, 838 P.2d at 299. Gray does not testify or introduce evidence that he did not intend for
heir agreements to be in writing. Generally, there is no requirement that a contract be in writing
lnless the parties did not intend the contract to be binding until the terms had been reduced to
~riting.Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana-PaciJic Corp., 136 Idaho 233,237, 3 1
'.3d 921 (2001). The factors which show an intent to have a written contract are:
(1) whether the contract is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are few or
many details, (3) whether the amount involved is large or small, (4) whether it
requires a formal writing for a full expression of the covenants and promises, and (5)
whether the negotiations indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the final
conclusion of negotiations.
d. An orai agreement will not be valid if the intent of the parties was to have a writing be the

'consummation of the negotiation." Id

In this case, the undisputed facts on the record support a conclusion that these parties
ntended these contracts to be in writing because throughout the negotiations, the parties were
:xchanging written drafts of the agreement. Moreover, both contained a section indicating the
lgreement was an integrated document.
At Gray's request, Gray's attorney and accountant drafted the first proposed agreements.
krthermore, these are the kinds of contracts usually put in writing, given the parties proposed a five
ear employment contract and given the option to purchase could not be exercised for five years.
The proposed contracts contained numerous details, and involved large amounts of money.
)RDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY
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The

matters covered in the draft employment agreement included detailed non-competition clauses,
detailed grounds for termination for cause (sexual harassment, alcohol or drug use, violence, etc.),
employee benefits (insurance, withholding), non-disclosure clauses and specifically provided for
attorney fees and indicated it was the entire integrated agreement. Likewise, the proposed draft
option agreement involved a great deal of money, required consideration and addressed areas like
warranties and detailed how the parties were to treat each other. Based on all of this, the Court finds
the parties clearly anticipated consummating any contract negotiations with a written document. The
parties agree none was ever consummated,
An oral agreement is & valid if the written draft is viewed by the parties as a mere record;
however, the oral agreement is not valid if the parties view the written draft as a consummation of
the negotiation. Id. Furthermore, "[wlhere it is clear that one party has agreed that an oral agreement
must be reduced to writing before it shall be binding, there is no contract until a formal document is
executed." Mitchell, 99 Idaho at 400, 582 P.2d at 1078 (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court
finds there was no meeting of the minds and no contracts were formed.
Finally, with respect to any option to purchase corporate stock five years from the date of
employment, Gray's draft option agreement clearly required him to pay the Petersons $5,000 as a
condition precedent. Gray admits that he never tendered the $5,000 consideration clearly anticipated
draft option agreement. Therefore, with respect to any option agreement, even if the parties
by
had an oral agreement, it was never consummated because Gray failed to tender the consideration
clearly required in his own draft agreement.
Finally, even if the Court were to determine that there were oral contracts, as Gray contends,
the statute of frauds precludes enforcement.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY
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11.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM ENFORCING
ANY ALLEGED CONTRACT.
It is undisputed that neither party ever signed any employment contract creating a written

contract. Thus, at best, Gray had an oral contract for employment. It is also undisputed that the
employment contract Gray contends existed was for a term of five years.
Likewise, it is undisputed that neither party signed any Option to Purchase Corporate Stock.
It is also undisputed that the draft option agreement clearly by its terms anticipated that the option

could not be exercised for five years.
For the purposes of this summary judgment analysis only, the Court assumed Gray and
Tri-Way had oral or implied employment contract as asserted by Gray and that Gray and the
Petersons had an oral option to purchase agreement as asserted by Gray. Therefore, the question
presented is whether the enforcement of those two oral agreements is prohibited by the statute of
frauds, LC. 5 9-505, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof.
A contract of employment for a fixed term greater than one year is subject to the statute of
frauds. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,20 P.3d 21 (Ct.
App. 2001); Burton v. Atomic Workers Fed Credit Union, 119 Idaho 17, 20, 803 P.2d 518, 521
(1990); Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18,23, 367 P.2d 579, 582 (1961). Likewise, an option to purchase

6

While Gray argues that Tri-Way and Peterson waived their right to rely on the statute of frauds and, thus, the Court
should not consider this defense, the Court disagrees. In Bluestone v. Mathewson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
where the defense was raised before trial and theparg was given time topresent argument in opposition, the defense of
statute of frauds can he raised for the first time in the snmmary judgment motion. Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho
453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982)(citing McKinley v. Bendir Corp., 420 F.Supp. 1001 (W.D.Mo.1976); Greenwald v. Cunard
Steam-Ship Company, 162 F.Snpp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.1958); See Baker v. Chicago, Fire 8r Burglary Detection, Inc., 489
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1973)); see also Good v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Ct. App. 1986). Furthermore, the
court has the inherent power to identify and to apply legal authorities germane to the controversy presented. Good v.
Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Ct. App. 1986). In this case, the Court gave both parties the opportunity to
address this issue and both did.
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stock contract which by its terms cannot be completed within one year (the sale of the stock nearly
five years after the alleged oral contract) is subject to the statute of frauds. Id.
The statute of frauds does not prevent the creation of an oral contract but precludes the
Thus, in Hoffman v. S. V. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 218 (1981), the
contract's enf~rcement.~
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that an oral contract for the conveyance of real
property had been formed but that failure to comply with the statute of frauds rendered the oral
agreement unenforceable. See also Treasure Valley GastroenterologySpecialists, supra; Hemingivay

v. Gruener, 106 Idaho 422,424,679 P.2d 1140, 1142 (1984); Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493,499,
849 P.2d 954, 960 (Ct.App.1992). Therefore, the alleged oral or implied employment contract, with
the bonus provisions upon which Gray relies, is rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds
unless there are circumstances which exempt this transaction from the strictures of the statute. Id
Likewise, any option to purchase at some time after five years is rendered unenforceable. Id.
Gray argues that by beginning to work for Tri-Way June 1,2004, part performance takes this
employment "contract" and the option contract out of the application of the statute of frauds. The
Court disagrees. First, it has long been established in Idaho law that the doctrine of part performance
is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of frauds because it cannot be
performed within one year. Id.; Allen, 84 Idaho at 23, 367 P.2d at 582. "The mere part performance
of such a contract does not take it out of the operation of the statute or permit a recovery under the
contract for any part of the contract remaining executory.... [T]o hold that part performance is
performance would be a nullification of the statute." Id (quoting 49 AM.JuR. 798,

5 497). See also

Burton, 119 Idaho at 20,803 P.2d at 52 1.
Second, under Idaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract from the
operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, "[tlhe doctrine of part performance is best understood as a
specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Treasure Valley Gastroenterology

Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26; Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493, 500, 849 P.2d 954, 961
(Ct.App. 1992). Therefore, the question whether part performance allows Gray to avoid application of
7

To the extent that Gray relies on an unreported opinion issued by the Magistrate Judge in the Federal Bankruptcy
Court, his reliance is misplaced. See Gomez v. Mastec North America, 2006 WL 36902 (D. Idaho 2006). Gray argues
that the Comt should simply excise portions of the employment agreement that are not directly tied to the five year
employment clause and enforce those provisions. He is simply wrong. This would nullify the Statute of Frauds.
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the statute of frauds depends upon whether the part performance is such as to equitably estop
Tri-Way from relying upon the statute as a defense. The Court finds it does not. The elemelits of
equitable estoppel with respect to the party to be estopped are:

... (1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to
assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by
the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to
the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question[;] (2) reliance upon the conduct of
the party estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his
position prejudicially.

Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490, 20 P.3d at 26; Tew v. Manwaring,
94 Idaho 50, 53, 480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971). See also Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 248, 259
P.2d 814, 817 (1953); Frantz, 111 Idaho at 1010, 729 P.2d at 1073. Where

these elements have

been proven, estoppel bars the party making the false representation from raising the statute of frauds
as a defense. Frantz, supra. 8

In this case, while the evidence may show there was an employment relationship, it is clear
that the actual terms of that relationship, in particular compensation, were still being negotiated and,
to be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance, an oral agreement "must
be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 365,
109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) (citing Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 723,874
P.2d 528, 534 (1994)). Like Lettunich, what is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement to be
enforced. See also Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Natl 119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d 900, 907
(1991). A contract will be enforced if it is "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or
contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Dursteler v.

Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 234, 697 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App.,1985) (quoting Giacobbi Square v.

PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (emphasis omitted). To meet this standard
the contract must embody a distinct understanding of the parties, showing a meeting of the minds as
8

Likewise, the party claiming estoppel must be referable @to the contractual term that is in dispute - in this case, the
bonus provisions. Treasure Valley Gastroenterologv Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26.
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to all necessary terms of the contract. The obligations of the parties must be identified so that the
adequacy of performance can be ascertained. Dale's Service Co., v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d
1102 (1975). If terms necessary to a contract are left for future negotiation, the contract cannot be
enforced. Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171,174 P.2d 202 (1946).
Contrary to Gray's conclusory statements that an agreement as to "regarding the substantial
terms of my employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including but not limited to,
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership interest in TriWay," there is no evidence to support his conclusion. Equitable estoppel assumes the existence of a
complete agreement, which is clearly lacking here. Therefore, equitable estoppel will not render
either the Draft Employment Agreement or the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock
enforceable.
Therefore, neither contract is enforceable and partial summary judgment is granted to
Tri-Way and to Peterson.
111.

SINCE THE PARTIES NEVER AGREED ON THE TERMS OF ANY BONUS,
GRAY'S STATUTORY WAGE CLAIM FAILS.
Gray also makes a claim for wages due and owing under Idaho Code

5

45-601 which

provides,
"Wage claim" means an employee's claim against an employer for compensation for
the employee's own personal services, and includes any wages, penalties, or damages
provided by law to employees with a claim for unpaid wages.
Tri-Way concedes that the term wage includes "any ascertainable unpaid commissions and
bargained-for compensation." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005).
Likewise, it concedes that a "claim for an employee bonus, which was calculated by reference to the
net profit of the defendant company and paid yearly, was part of the compensation bargained for in
the agreement of employment." Johson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 367, 679 P.2d 640
(1984).
However, Tri-Way argues that because the bonus was the part of the contract that was never
finally agreed to, there was never a "bargained for agreement" in this case and no possible wage
claim. On this issue, Gray argues that since there is an issue of fact whether there was a valid
agreement summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the Court disagrees. As discussed
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY
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ibove, Gray introduces no evidence that the parties ever actually agreed on the terms of his bonus.
rhus, this cause of action fails.
Therefore, based on the above the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 5" day of June 2007.

&$YYCLL,
Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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Defendant.
On August 3, 2006, Robert Gray moved this Court to grant summary judgment dismissing
Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") counterclaims.' Gray supported his Motion with
affidavits and documents. Tri-Way opposed and filed supporting affidavits.
The Court heard argument September 25, 2006, and ordered the parties into mediation.
Mediation failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation of
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2007.
Although Gray moved for s w a r y judgment on counts I-VI of Tri-Way's counterclaims,
Tri-Way only responded to Counts I (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing), IV (Tortious Interference with Contract), and V (Conversion). Therefore, as to Counts II,

III and VI, the Court dismisses those counts.

22

Furthermore, for the reasons stated below, the Court denies Gray's Motion for Summary

23

Judgment as to the remaining Counts I, IV and V finding there are disputes of material facts. By

24

reference, the Court hereby incorporates the factual statement found in its Order Granting Summary

25

Judgment to Tri-Way dated June 5,2007.

26
27

11

ANALYSIS

28

Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

29

"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on iile, together with the affidavits,

31
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1

[any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
3

a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.

5 56(c); See also First Security Bank of Idaho, N A . v.

lurphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). A party against whom summary judgment
s sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and

~roduceadmissible evidence to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine
ssue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. LA. Freeman
Zo., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d
224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial
:ourt in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
On causes of action to he tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to
he benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & M Farms

. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v.
deridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are
iberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v.
:offin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
Although Gray moved for summary judgment on counts I-VI of Tri-Way's counterclaims,
hi-Way only responded to Counts I (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
lealing), IV (Tortious Interference with Contract), and V (Conversion). Therefore, as to Counts 11,
I1 and VI, the Court dismisses those counts. However, with respect to the remaining counterclaims,
he Court finds that there are disputes of material facts that preclude summary judgment.
Therefore, based on the above Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment on the conversion,
ortious interference with contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
lenied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 1lthday of June 2007.

District Judge
The Court granted summary judgment to Tri-Way on its Motion on June 5,2007.
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JUL O 3 2007

Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CVOC 0409193D
Plaintiff
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRIWAY

v.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey

1

Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through his counsel of record, Holland &
Hart, LLP, moves for an order clarifying the Court's Order regarding Tri-Way's Motion
for Summary Judgment entered on June 5, 2007 ("June 5 Order").
Gray seeks clarification that the June 5 Order is limited to Gray's claim for
Breach of Contract (Count I) and his Statutory Claim for Wages (Count 111).
The June 5 Order discusses Gray's claim for Breach of Contract. (June 5 Order,
at 9-16). At the conclusion of the Court's discussion of the Breach of Contract claim,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF GRANTING MOTION F O Q O l ( ) Z
SUMMARY JUDGMENT T O TRI-WAY - 1

\h

the J u n e 5 Order states "neither contract is enforceable and partial summary judgment is
granted as to Tri-Way and Peterson." (Id at 16). In turn, the June 5 Order considers
Gray's Statutory Wage Claim. (Id. at 16-17). After considering the Statutory Wage
Claim, the Order states "[tlhus,

this cause

(June 5 Order at 17)

of action fails."

(emphasis added).
The June 5 Order is silent regarding Gray's other causes of action. Accordingly,
Gray understands that five of his causes of action (Counts 11, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII)
remain to be tried before a jury. Accordingly, Gray requests that the Court clarify that
its June 5th Order is limited to Gray's Breach of Contract Claim (Count 1) and his
Statutory Wage Claim (Count 111).
Such clarification is necessary in order to eliminate the various uncertainties in
the Court's June 5th Order. Clarifying these uncertainties will help facilitate adequate
litigation of the claims in this matter.
This Motion is supported by the Court's record.
DATED this

/Ip

day of July, 2007.

HOLLAND & HART

LLP

Attorneys for ~ i a i n t i f fRobert Gray
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J
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day of July 2007, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Jason G. Murray, Esq.
MOFFATT
THOMASBARRETT
ROCK
& FIELDS,CHTD.
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829
Fax: (208) 385-5384

C]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax)
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI

I

II

I

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT GRAY,
Plaintiff,

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC.

I
//11

Case No. CVOC 040919333

I

ORDER CLARIFYING JUNE 5,2007
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
AND CORRECTING THE ORDER

Defendant.
On August 3, 2006, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc ("Tri-Way") moved this Court to
grant summary judgment finding the parties never entered into an employment contract. Tri-Way
supported its Motion with affidavits and documents. Robert Gray opposed and filed supporting
affidavits. Tri-Way replied

heard argument September 25, 2006, and sua sponte ordered further briefing
III I regardingThetheCourt
applicability of the statute of frauds to the employment agreement because by its terms
the parties contemplated a five year term of employment. Both parties filed additional memoranda.
The Court further ordered the parties into mediation.
Mediation failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation
of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2007.
On June 5,2007, the Court granted Tri-Way summary judgment and issued a Memorandum
Decision. July 3, 2007, Gray moved the Court to clarify its decision to indicate whether it intended
/ / t ogrant summary judgment to Tri-Way on all counts.
In reviewing the prior decision, the Court observed a typographical error and hereby issues
this errata. Section 111, paragraph 1 is corrected to read as follows with the change underlined.

I

Gray also makes a claim for wages due and owing under Idaho Code 5 45-601 which
provides,
"Wage claim" means an employee's claim against an employer for
compensation for the employee's own personal services, and includes any

ORDER CLARIFYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
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wages, penalties, or damages provided by law to employees with a claim for
unpaid wages.
Tri-Way concedes that the term wage includes "any ascertainable unpaid
commissions and bargained-for compensation." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho
809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005). Likewise, it concedes that a claim for an emplovee bonus
may be part of the compensation bargained for in the agreement of ernplovment.
Johnson v. AlJiedStores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,367,679 P.2d 640 (1984).

II

For the reasons stated below, the Court clarifies its June 5, 2007, decision.

1
1

This dispute arises out of an alleged employment contract between Robert Gray and Tri-Way,

I l a Washington corporation. Tri-Way is a general contractor building commercial construction

projects. In 2004, Tri-Way was expanding its operations into Arizona. Gray worked as a senior

I

1
I
/

construction manager for Albertson's Inc. when he began negotiations for employment with Tri-Way

1

Construction in January 2004. Albertson's was going through a down-sizing and by 2002 had laid off
at least half of its construction managers. Gray had begun working for Albertsons in 1986.

I
/

a February 2004, meeting with Tri-Way, Gray retained counsel to prepare a written
I1 I agreementFollowing
containing the proposed terms of his employment and a proposal whereby Gray would
11 buy out Peterson's interest. On March 10,2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard at Tri-Way /
11 that he would have his counsel prepare a proposed employment agreement. Gray testified in his /

11

deposition that there was no agreement between the parties as to any material terms.

I

I1 /I included a buy-out of Gary Peterson's interest in the Seattle-Portland business and a salary and bonus I
/plan. Gray proposed that Allard, Peterson and Gray each contribute $15,000 to a capital account to I
11 provide start-up costs for the Arizona venture. Gray also proposed that the Arizona and Seatile- I
11 Portland operations be tracked separately until 2008 when they would be combined. Under his I
On March 16,2004, Gray e-mailed an outline of his employment proposal to Tri-Way which

proposal, none of the parties would take dividends out of the retained earnings until 2009, and at that
time Gray's share would be 33% of the retained earnings.

I

These facts are undisputed. To the extent any facts are disputed, Gray's facts are considered true for the purposes of
Tri-Way's summary judgment only. To the extent Gray "argues" that his conclusion that an agreement had been reached
is a fact, thereby creating a material dispute, the Court disagrees. It is a legal conclusion.
ORDER CLARIFYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
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For 2004, Gray proposed he would draw a minimal salary of $400 per week, and in 2005 he
~ o u l dbe paid $110,000 either as salary or draws. This amount would increase by 8% through 2008.
3ray proposed that as of January 1, 2009, he would become 50-50 partners in the Tri-Way Sealtle'ortland operation. However, he indicated he was open to suggestions. Gray testified that on or
ibout April 29,2004, he sent an e-mail to his accountant, Rob Grover, referencing partnership papers
hat he was having his attorney draft for a "corporation/partnership in Arizona."
On May 19, 2004, Gray e-mailed his initial

raft^ Employment Agreement, drafted by his

ittomey. It proposed a term of employment of 5 years, beginning June 1,2004, and ending August
L, 2009, unless otherwise terminated as provided in the draft agreement. He also proposed that his

;alary would be $4,000 per month until January 2005 when it would raise to $10,000. The draft also
ncluded an annual bonus of 50% of the net profits before taxes of only the Arizona operation. This
iraft differed significantly from the proposal Gray e-mailed Tri-Way on March 16, 2004. Peterson
icknowledged he received the e-mail with the draft proposal on May 19, 2004, at 10:31 in the
norning.
Gray testified that prior to May 21St, his attorney also generated what was labeled a Draft
3ption to Purchase Corporate Stock. Gray testified that this document was discussed at the May 21''
neeting. This document was clearly labeled a draft. In it, Gray agreed he would tender $5,000 to
he Petersons when the agreement was executed as consideration for the Petersons granting him the
~ptionto puchase their stock. He testified he never tendered (or offered) the $5,000 to Peterson and
hat no party ever signed the Option to Purchase. That draft agreement also proposed that Gray
odd be entitled to exercise the option to puchase the Petersons' stock at "any time during the

Ieriod from April 1, 2009 through and including August 1, 2009," approximately five years in the

-.

Peterson testified neither nor his wife ever agreed to this option.
Subsequent to this draft, another draft was prepared. This new draft contained Gray's

landwritten notes. No party ever executed this draft. Gray testified that he sent e-mails to Peterson
md that in an e-mail dated July 27, 2004, he wrote: "I also hope to have the final draft of our
igreements with me, so we could possibly go over those and sign them, and I could hand you your
;5,000."
The document is clearly labeled ''Draft."
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Gray quit his job at Albertson's May 1, 2004,

the parties met to discuss Gray's draft

greement on May 21, 2004, and before Gray e-mailed his initial Draft Employment Agreement or
cnt Peterson a copy of the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock.
The parties, Gary Allard, Gary Peterson, Peterson's wife and Gray, met on May 21, 2004.
'eterson testified at his deposition that Tri-Way (Allard, Peterson and his wife) told Gray they
sjected Gray's proposed employment agreement. Gray denies they told him that and testified in his
ffidavit as follows:
As of May 21, 2004, I had an agreement regarding the substantial terms of my
employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including but not limited to,
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership
interest in Tri-Way .
On May 21, 2004 during the meeting regarding my employment with Tri-Way, Gary
Peterson and Ray Allard gave me the impression that we had an agreement regarding
my option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tri-Way and regarding my
compensation. Based on their conduct during the meeting, I believed that we had
reached an agreement3
lowever, subsequent to this May 21Stmeeting, Gray acknowledges that another draft was prepared -ixhibit 7 to Gray's deposition. Gray acknowledged this draft was prepared

after the

May 21''

ieeting. While the date it was actually prepared is unclear, Gray testified it obviously reflected a
der version of the emplovment agreement because it contained a non-compete and non-disclosure
lause discussed at the May 21,2004, meeting; his draft did not contain these items. Therefore, he
:stified it must have been prepared

after the

May 21, 2004, meeting. Gray also testified the

.andwritten changes to Exhibit 7 were his, and he further testified that Exhibit 7 was not the same
ocument used at the May 21,2004, meeting. His handwritten changes reflect significant changes to
alary and the bonus pay provisions.
Gray began working for Tri-Way on June I, 2004; opening its Arizona office, even though
dmittedly no party had signed aw emploment or buv-out agreement. After he began working,
;ray and Tri-Way continued to negotiate his employment contract and the buy-out agreement.'

These two statements represent Gray's conclusions that he had an agreement and represent his perceptions. They are
lctual statements.
In preparing this Clarification, the Court reviewed all of the affidavits contained in the file. This case has been hard
~ g h and
t Tri-Way initially moved the Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court notes that in two
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Tri-Way's attorneys prepared another version, (labeled "Ver. 1 6/04/04" at the top) reflecting
some of the things discussed at the May 21'' meeting. This version was dated three days after Gray
began working and modified his proposed salary, reducing the 2005 salary to $8,000 per month and
pro-rating the proposed incentive or bonus pay. This version is clearly a draft because it contained

/ / typed italicized remarks inserted in the middle of text - most significantly -- text directly addressing

1

compensation and bonuses. For example, in Article 4, which addressed compensation and incentive

/ / or bonus pay, this draft contained the following language inserted in the middle of the text:
Section 4.2. Performance Based Salary. . . . * this section is too confusing?
*computed when+each month at the end of the first year?

Peterson testified he rejected this version.
Gray testified that this version reflected some of the things discussed in the May 21Stmeeting,

// but he did not believe it accurately reflected evervthing discussed in the meeting.

In fact,

testified he wanted the non-compete to be chanrred. Likewise, Gray testified that he recalled
receiving a subseauent version labeled "Ver.2 6110.04" at the top. Gray testified that this June 10,

11 2004, version contained changes Gray suggested, and his handwritten notes on this version suggests

11
II

further changes. Like the previous version, it also contained m e d italicized remarks inserted in the
middle of text expressing continued concerns about the language in the compensation and bonus

II section, among other things.

I11I

Gray claims that there were no huther discussions about the employment agreement beyond
June 22,2004, twenty-two days after he began working for Tri-Way and testified as follows:
A.
I believe they were completed and there were no discussions necessary at this
point.

And why do you say that?
Q.
A.
Because of the discussions that took place on May 21'' and final drafts were
executed between June 1'' and June loth

Q.

When you say "final drafts were executed," what do you mean by "executed"?

affidavits submitted by Gray (dated April 27,2005, and May 12 2005, respectively), be testified under oath that he began
work for Tri-Way May 2004 and that he immediately obtained two Albertson's projects on behalf of Tri-Way as
Tri-Way's employee.
5

While Gray disputes there were continued "negotiations," his own exhibits clearly demonstrate that the agreement
continued to evolve over a period of time subsequent to his beginning employment and that the parties continued to
discuss the important provisions regarding compensation.
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A.

I mean typed.

Q.

Prepared?

A.

Prepared.

Q.

Okay. ~ e v i s e d ? ~

A.

Correct.

Okay. And yet none of those revised agreements were signed by any party at
Q.
any time, correct?
A.

Correct.

On July 27,2004, ao~roximately6 weeks after he began working, Gray e-mailed Peterson, in
relevant part, as follows:
I also hope to have the final draft of our agreements with me, so we could possibly go
over those and sign them, and I could hand you your $5,000.
The parties continued to modify and discuss the salary and bonus provisions throughout September
2004, as well as, the proposed buy-out agreement. During this period, the parties had numerous
conversations negotiating the employment agreement terms. Peterson testified that the Arizona
division would not effectively be run if 50 percent of its net profits were being taken out in cash and
given to Gray. These concerns caused Peterson to have his attorney to make further revisions to the
compensation provision in the employment agreement -- Article 4.
Gray testified that around September 1, 2004, Tri-Way began attempting to change portions
of the "agreement." On September 13, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard, in relevant
part, as follows:
I understand from our conversation that if AZ profit for the year was $300,000 for
example, and $184,000 after taxes, your proposal was to have me take 50% of the
$184,000, or $92,000, as my annual bonus. Of the remaining $92,000, % was going
to go to the company as retained earnings, and % was going to go to a separate escrow
account, which would fund the buyout (or a portion thereof) in 4 years as a dividend
payout to Gary [Peterson]. This agreement you sent me below doesn't say that. It
says % of my 50% bonus would go to the escrow account each year. Which defeats
the purpose of having the option to buy stock agreement, and would be unacceptable
to me anyway. If you can have this revised to read the way it was discussed, I'll pass

6

Neither party introduced any evidence of a "final" version that contained no italicized conunents clearly suggesting
continued concerns about the versions.
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it on to my CPA for review and get back to both of you. If I misunderstood our
discussion, please let me know.
'eterson responded by e-mail as follows:
Rob
Think about what you are asking. You want Ray and I to buy me out in 4 % years and
give you half of the company!
The 50% after taxes that is for the owners will stay in retained earnings as cash flow.
Your 50% as we discussed will be divided with % in cash bonus to you and the other
half to remain in the company as a separate account to use as the purchase agreement.
Any questions - Please respond.
Gary
I n October 2,2004, Gray sent another proposal to Ray Allard and indicated this was a "last gasp" to
'try and put this deal together." Gray gave Tri-Way until October 25, 2004, to agree to his terms.
3ctober 20, 2004, he returned the company credit cards and on October 21, 2004, he e-mailed Ray
qllard, as follows:
As I mentioned in our conversation earlier today [October 21,20041, I'd like to make
next Friday my last day with Tri Way. . . .
I will not seek reimbursement from Tri Way for those costs I incurred in Attorney and
CPA fees as we tried to draft our apreements over the last 6 months, even though they
are substantial. As is the earnest money deposit I'll be walking away from on the
house here in Phoenix. As is the amount of depleted retirement savings. Buy [sic]
hey, like I said, I'm a big boy and I put myself into this nightmare, I'll have to dig
myself (and my family) out of it.
I would hope that whatever portion of the profits I generated for Tri Way over the last
4 months that you and Gary feel I'm entitled to could be paid to me by November lSt.
:Emphasis added.) October 26, 2004, Gray again e-mailed Ray Allard and Peterson in relevant part
IS

follows:
Gary,
Just wanted to thank you for the opportunity to t
w to put this 'deal' together over the
last few months. . . .
Let me try to explain: The last two weeks were not good ones for me. After 5 or 6
months of effort, I have to admit that our failure to put this deal together. . .

Emphasis added.)

Gray testified he "refused to allow" Tri-Way to make the proposed

'modifications" and that on or about October 22,2004, Tri-Way emailed Gray terminating him.
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Peterson testified that Gray gave Tri-Way an October 25,2004, deadline to respond to Gray's

I1final offer. However, according to Tri-Way, at some point prior to October 20, 2004, Gray returned
all the corporate credit cards and on October 21, 2004, Gray tendered his resignation. Gray does not
dispute that he returned all the corporate credit cards. He claims, however, he was terminated by TriWay.
According to Tri-Way, it paid Gray the agreed-upon salary for the work he had done so far
and offered him a bonus of $60,000. Gray brought two projects to Tri-Way - generating gross
revenues of $960,000 and $215,000. Kathy Peterson testified that the Arizona division generated

11 $271,792.48 in net profits from June 2004 to September 30,2004.
10

I

Gray testified that Tri-Way misrepresented and concealed certain facts which form the basis
of the cause of his action for fraud and upon which he claims he relied. He testified Tri-Way

/ / represented to him that he could purchase Gary Peterson's interest in Tri-Way for a certain amount. I

1

l3For example, he testified he was unaware that Kathy Peterson owned a 25% interest in Tri-Way,

11

l4until the May 21'' meeting or that she was unwilling to sell her shares. However, in his deposition,
15
Gray testified that he never had any discussions with her about her willingness to sell her shares and
16
no one ever communicated to him that she was unwilling. Gray also testified that Tri-Way
17
represented it would compensate him "at an escalating base salary as well as at an annual amount
18
equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts [Tri-Way]." Gray asserts that
19
because of the representations made regarding these terms, he quit his job at Alhertson's and
20
accepted employment with Tri-Way.
21
Gray brought suit alleging breach of contract, a statutory claim for wages, promissory
22
estoppel, equitable estoppel, and fraud. Relevant to this Motion for Summary Judgment, Gray seeks
23
"past and future" loss of income, including income that he "would have received in merit and
24
longevity wage increases," and "past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would
25
ordinarily have received." He also sought enforcement of the "Draft Option to Purchase Corporate
26
Stock."
27
Tri-Way and Peterson moved for summary judgment and asked the Court to dismiss all
28
Gray's claims with prejudice.
29

(I
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1

I

4
ANALYSIS
2

Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

3

"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

4

/ 1 if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled !

5

to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 5 56(c); See also First Security Bank o f Idaho, N.A. v.

6

Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790, 964 P.2d 654,657 (1998). A party against whom summaly judgment

11 is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and 1

11

admissibie evidence to contradict the assextions of the moving party and establish a genuine
issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman

' 11

Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d

I

I
1/ court in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
I
On causes of action to be tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to /
/ 1 the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & M Farms I
1224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial

v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 85 1 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v.

Meridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v.

Cofln, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
A.

GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON QUANTUM MERUIT OR IMPLIED CONTRACT
FAILS.
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied in fact contract and permits a

22 party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or materials provided on the basis of an

I

I

1

23

implied promise to pay. Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, -,I37

24

Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191,108 P.3d 332,338 (2005). "An implied in fact

25

contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the

26

conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by the other often being

27

inferred from the circumstances attending the performance." Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc , 137

P.3d 417, 422 (2006); B a h v.

28 Idaho 703,708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002) (quoting Farnworth v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283,287, 869
29
30

P.2d 1378,1382 (1994)).

31
2T,
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1

The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding; it

2

is a contract. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). A contract

3

implied-in-fact is a true contract whose existence and terms are inferred from the conduct of the

4 parties. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997) (citing Continental

1

5 Wrest Prods.. Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974). Such a
6 contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. Id., 95 Idaho at 743, 518 P.2d

/

at 1205. Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 574, 887 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Ct. App. 1994). "The

/I general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at I
the other's request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract

lo implied in fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991 (1986)
(citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98

11 Idaho 324,325,563 P.2d 48,49 (1977)).
13
l4
l5
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26

I

For a quantum meruit claim, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the services
rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched and the burden is on
the party claiming quantum mernit. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 434-435, 64 P.3d 959, 963-964
(Ct. App. 2002). This is an objective measure and is proven by evidence demonstrating the nature of
the work and the customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was
performed. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934 P.2d 951, 960 (Ct. App. 1997); Peavey v.

Pellandini, 97 Idaho at 659, 551 P.2d at 614. Thus, if the dispute was that Gray had not been
compensated for his services, this would he a jury issue.
However, Gray does not dispute that he was compensated for his services at the agreed upon
salary. The issue is whether he was entitled to a bonus and the value of that bonus (if any).7 To the
extent this quantum meruit claim is based on the alleged agreed upon bonus, as the Court ruled on
his wage claim, Gray introduced no evidence that the parties ever actually agreed on the terms of his
bonus. They continued to negotiate right up until Gray quit. In addition, in response to the summary

'

Although unclear, Gray also apparently claims that he should he compensated for the value of the two projects he
brought to Tri-Way. While be characterizes this as a quantum meruit claim, it is really a claim of unjust enrichment
based on the value Tri-Way received from receiving the two projects and not based on "the nature of the work and the
customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was performed." Thus, quantum meruit is not
appropriate for this claim.
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judgment motion, he introduced no evidence that the customary rate of pay for his work in the
community at the time the work was performed included such a bonus. Thus lilce his wage claim,
this cause of action fails. See also Robertson v. Hansen, 89 Idaho 107, 111, 403 P.2d 585, 587
(1965); Weatherhead v. Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 P. 760 (1919)~ Tri-Way's motion for summary
judgment is granted on this issue.

B.

GRAY'S CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT FAILS
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in law.

Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004) (citing Peavey v
Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 658, 551 P.2d 610, 613 (1976)). A contract implied in law, or quasicontract, "is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about
justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties, and, in some cases,
in spite of an agreement between the parties." Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434-35, 64 P.3d
959,963-64 (Ct.App.2002). Recovery under an unjust enrichment theory is limited to the amount by
which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id. at 434, 64 P.3d at 963; 66 Am.Jur.2d. ~EsTITuTroN
AND

IMPLIED
CONTRACTS2 (1973). The essence of a contract implied in law is that a party has

received a benefit from another which it would be inequitable for him to retain without
compensation to the other. In Smith v. Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that:
"Restitution" and "unjust enrichment" are the modem designations for the older
doctrine of "quasi contracts." The substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies
in a promise, implied by law, that a party will render to the person entitled thereto that
which in equity and good conscience belongs to the latter.
95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973).
The unjust enrichment doctrine, also referred to as quasi-contract, contract implied in law, or
restitution, allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff which it
would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit.

Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974);

8

The Court notes that these cases involve the application of I.C. $ 9-508 which is similar to the statute of frauds. I.C. 8
9-508 requires a11 real estate brokerage contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. As the court stated in Weatherhead
when it rejected arguments similar to the ones before this Court: "The vital question is whether recovery can be had on a
quantwn meruit in the face of this statute, there being admittedly no written contract. . . We think the construction
contended for by appellant would absolutely nullify the statute."
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ldaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 744, 710 P.2d 647, 654 (Ct.App.1993). In this case,
Gray's contention is that Tri-Way was unjustly enriched by the two projects he brought to the
:ompany. Thus, he argues the recipient (Tri-Way) must make restitution to him.

However,

~ccordingto the Idaho case law, restitution shall be made only to the extent that, as between the two,
the benefit would be unjust for the recipient to retain. Idaho Lumber, 109 Idaho at 744,710 P.2d at
554. The burden is on Gray to establish what that amount is?
Importantly, the measure of recovery in a quasi-contractual action is

the actual amount of

the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between the two parties it would be unjust

for one party to retain. Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); 66 Am.Jur.2d,
RESTITUTION

AND IMPLIEDCONTRACTS,
at p.

946 (1973). "Thus, the substance of an action for unjust

enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that
which in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter." Hixon, 76 Idaho 333, 281 P.2d 1045.
In Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, the Supreme Court wrote:
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable where the plaintiff in
an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the benefit
conferred upon the defendant.
101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980) (lessee harvested fall crop that leaser had planted
and then planted the next crop, but before it could be harvested the leaser sold the property).
In Blaser v. Cameron, the Court of Appeals indicated that a party seeking recovery under an
unjust enrichment theory must present evidence not only of the value of the services it rendered, but
also "the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the [defendant], would result in their unjust
snrichment." 121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991). The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim for unjust enrichment
because it did not present evidence of the amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id.;

See also, Hertz v. Fiscus, supra (tenant remodeled restaurant-lounge business and then the
relationship soured and the landlord took possession of the business); Continental Forest Products,

' Furthermore, to the extent Gray may rely on his "employment"

agreement, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an
implied-in-law contract cannot create an employment relationship. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, -, 930 P.2d
1026, 1029-1030 (1997). For a quasi-contractual obligation to arise, Tri-Way would have to have been unjustly enriched
>y its retention of the benefits of Gray's services (as opposed to the two projects). In this case, however, Tri-Way was

001.16
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Tnc. v. Chandler Supply Co., supra (lumber wholesaler ordered and received two carloads of
plywood from a different lumber broker than the one from which the order was placed); Smith v.

Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 51 1 P.2d 294 (1973) (relatives brought suit to quit title to property and to
$etermine the individual interests in the property); Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd.,

supra (purchaser entitled to recover reliance damages from seller on a real estate contract); Pichon
v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 108 Idaho 846, 702 P.2d 884 (Ct.App.1985) (vendor of real estate brought

action to recover damage caused by purchaser in default); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, supra (owner
of rented property was enriched by the remodeling accomplished at the request of the lessee by the
contractor).
Similarly, the Court finds that in response to summary judgment, Gray introduced no
evidence of the amount Tri-Way was enriched by bringing it two projects. Thus, his claim for unjust
enrichment fails and summary judgment to Tri-Way is entered on this issue.
Finally, in two affidavits submitted by Gray (dated April 27, 2005, and May 12 2005,
respectively), he testified under oath that he began work for Tri-Way May 2004 and that he
immediately obtained two Albertson's projects on behalf of Tri-Way as Tri-Way's employee. He
points to no case law that would allow an employee to recover the profit earned by an employer
simply by virtue of the employee's labor absent an agreement. Therefore, the Court grants summary
judgment to Tri-Way on this issue.
C.

GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL" PAILS
As previously ruled in the June 7,2007, decision, equitable estoppel assumes the existence of

a complete agreement, which is lacking here. Therefore, the Court need not address the issue of
whether equitable estoppel even applies as an exception to LC. $ 9-505(5). Lettunich v. Key Bank

Nut. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Tri-Way's motion for summary
judgment is granted on this issue.

not unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits of Gray's services. Even if Tri-Way received a "benefit" from
Gray's services, Tri-Way compensated Gray for his services.
'O

The Court has already ruled on his promissory estoppel claim.
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1

D.

2

Finally, Gray claims fraud. In Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474, (1986) the Idaho

3

Supreme Court set forth the elements for a cause of action in Idaho based on fraud:

4
5

6
7
0

Q
"

1

17
.-

' '

15

Fuw v Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,389,613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980) Gray must make a prima facie
There is no indication in the record that Gray was justified in relying upon any alleged oral

11 representations made by Tri-Way that they had an agreement. By his own admission, Gray clearly
knew that the agreement terms were still being negotiated when he began working for Tri-Way.

13
IA

The elements for a cause of action based on fraud are: (1) a representation; (2) its
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its
truth; (5) speaker's intent that it should be acted upon by another person and in
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) hearer's
reliance on trutk (8) hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) hearer's consequent and
proximate injury.
case on each element. Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331,597 P.2d 217 (1979).

10
11

GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON FRAUD FAILS.

II

Furthermore, the draft agreement was not even prepared by Tri-Way; Gray prepared it. The
agreement itself cannot be the basis of any alleged representations.

The Court is not required to simply accept Gray's conclusory opinions that he had an
I/ 1/ agreement
when the facts so clearly indicate that when he began working for Tri-Way he himself
17
1 continued to send and receive draA agreements with italicized words in the very sections addressing
18
I I the bonus issue indicating the provisions needed revisions. Moreover, there is no evidence that there
19
11 was ever any agreement on the buy-out. Therefore, Gray was not justified in relying on Tri-Way's
20
16

21

alleged oral representations nor was he ignorant of the inaccuracy of any alleged Tri-Way's oral

22

representations to the effect he had an agreement on the bonus or the buyout.

23
24

11 motion.Therefore, the Court clarifies that it grants Tri-Way's and Peterson's summary judgment

25

IT IS SO ORDERED.

26

Dated this 6"' day of August 2007.

El--+

Cheri C. Copsey
District ~udge

27
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PETERSON, an individual; GARY
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COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through their undersigned counsel,
and hereby stipulate and agree that all counterclaims or causes of action brought on behalf of
defendantslcounterclaimantsGary Peterson and Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., against the

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF
COUNTERCLAIM WITH PREJUDICE - 1

plaintifficounterdefendant, Robert Gray, which remain following the Court's Order Denying in
Part and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on or about June 11,
2007, may be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2007.
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HOLLAND
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Erik F. Stidharn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintifflcounterdefendant

DATED this 6th day of September, 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF
COUNTERCLAIMS WITH
PREJUDICE

I

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic],-and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

The stipulation of defendants/counterclaimants Gary Peterson and Tri-Way
Construction Services, Inc., and the plaintifflcounterdefendant,Robert Gray, having come before
this Court and good cause appearing therefor;

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL
OF COUNTERCLAlMS WITH PREJUDICE 1

-

-

IT IS HEREBY O D E R E D AND THIS DOES ORDER that the counterclaims of
defendants/counterclairnantsare hereby dismissed with prejudice.
k
4

DATED this

day of September, 2007.

k

The Honorable Cheri C. yopsey,
District Judge
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. . 343-8869

( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

J

Jason G. Murray
MOFFATT,
THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK&
FIELDS,CHTD.
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829
Facsimile (208) 385-5384

( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Distnct ourt Clerk
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172
MOFFATT, THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK &
FIELDS,CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
pmo@moffatt.com
jgm@moffatt.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT

c-

VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

The Motion for Sumrnary Judgment filed on behalf of defendants having come
before the Court and being briefed and argued; and
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The Court being fully advised in the premises and having issued its Order
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way on June 5,2007, and its subsequent Order
Clarifying June 5,2007 Summary Judgment Order and Correcting the Order on August 7,2007;
NOW THEREFORE, Judgment on the plaintiffs amended complaint is hereby
entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and plaintiffs action is dismissed as

-

against said defendants.

th
DATED this

day of

,2007.

1

LC+

The Honorable Cheri C. cops&
- ~District Judge
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with
Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of the
entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the above final
judgment be entered.
DATED this -day of

,2007.

The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this B b a y of
,2007, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Erik F. Stidham
HOLLAND
&HARTLLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Facsimile (208) 343-8869

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jason G. Murray
MOFFATT,
THOMAS,
BARRETT,
ROCK& FIELDS
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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Deputy Clerk
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Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172
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ROCK&
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
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Facsimile (208) 385-5384
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

I

COME NOW the above-named defendants, by and through undersigned counsel,
and pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code Sections
12-120(3) and 12-12], move this Court for an award of attorney fees in addition to those costs
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allowed as a matter of right and other discretionary costs described in those Rules. The basis for
defendants' motion is as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION

As prevailing parties, defendants Tri-Way Construction Services, Tnc., Gary
Peterson, Kathy Peterson and Ray Allard (collectively "Tri-Way" or "defendants") seek to
recover all attorneys' fees that they have incurred in defending against the various claims
brought by plaintiff Rob Gray in this matter involving a purported employment contract. On
June 5,2007, following over two years of litigation, the Court issued its Order Granting Motion
for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way, granting summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims
alleged against the defendants. On June 14,2007, the Court entered an Order Denying in Part
and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment. In short, the Court dismissed
Counts 11, I11 and VI because they were abandoned by defendants. However, the Court denied
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on those claims which defendants opposed. Plaintiffs
subsequently moved for clarification of the Court's Order granting Tri-Way summaryjudgment,
and an Order Clarifying Summary Judgment Order was entered on August 6,2007, making it
amply clear that defendants had prevailed on all causes of action raised by plaintiffs. A final
Judgment was entered by the Court in defendants' favor on September 12,2007. As prevailing
parties, defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-121

11.
A.

ARGUMENT

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) represents a substantial policy of the state of
Idaho.
The Idaho courts have routinely described the mandatory award of attorneys' fees

pursuant to Section 12-120(3) as a "cost o f using the lldahol court svstem to resolve disputes in
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specified types" of actions which "allocates this cost between the parties." Sanders v. Lanybrd,
134 Idaho 322,325, 1 P.3d 823,826 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines,
106 Idaho 288,291,678 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1984)) (emphasis added). In explaining that an award
of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) is a "fair" cost of using the Idaho court
system, the Idaho Court of Appeals in De Wils described the effect and purpose of Section 12120(3) as follows:
Section [12-120(3)] produces a harsh result for the losing party in
litigation over a commercial dispute. This party suffers not only
the outcome of the dispute and his own legal expense, but also is
burdened with costs and attorney fees awarded to the other side.
However, this result is fair i f the benefits and costs o f litixation
are identified in advance and the parties can guide their decision
accordinglt. The parties are abjured by the statute to evaluate
carefully the merits of their claims or defenses in the commercial
dispute. When decidinp whether to litipate, each oarto must
w e i . the potential benefits o f prevailinp apainst the potential
costs o f losinp. There is a direct relationship between a parto's
decision to litixate a commercial dispute and the benefits or costs
which flow from that decision.
106 Idaho at 293,678 P.2d at 85 (emphasis added). Though the De Wils case specifically dealt
with an underlying commercial transaction, the same reasoning applies to the facts and claims in
the present matter, as it was based upon a "contract relating to . . . services." See Idaho Code
Section 12-120(3).
As further evidence that Section 12-120(3) represents a substantial policy of the
state of Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals has made it clear that an award of attorneys' fees in
cases involving a contract under Section 12-120(3) is mandatory as opposed to discretionary.
See Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85,87,753 P.2d 296 (1988) (emphasis added). Specifically,
the Idaho Court of Appeals has described the nature and purpose of Section 12-120(3) as
follows:
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However, we think a different analysis is required to LC. 5 12-120.
Unlike LC. $5 12-121 and 61-617A, LC. 611120 provides for a
mandatory, not discretionary. award o f attornev fees to the
prevailing partv. . . . The automatic nature of an award under I.C.
5 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlying . . .
agreement between the parties. It establishes an entitlement.
Id. (emphasis added).

As additional support for the strong policy in favor of mandatory attorney fee
awards under Section 12-120(3), the Idaho Supreme Court held in Ward v. PureGro Co., 128
Idaho 366,913 P.2d 582 (1996), that Section 12-120(3) required an award of attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party when the nature of the underlying suit was among those specifically listed
under the statute. Among the issues raised on appeal in the Ward case was the claim that no
attorney fees should be awarded under Section 12-120(3) because the substantive merits of the
contract claim had been analyzed under California law. Nevertheless, when it came to the
determination of whether Ward was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, the Idaho Supreme
Court strengthened the policy in favor of mandatory attorney fees under Section 12-120(3) by
awarding fees to Ward as the prevailing party, notwithstanding the fact that the substantive
contract claims were analyzed under the substantive law of another state. In so doing, the Idaho
Supreme Court explicitly held:
LC. 5 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on a
contract relating to a "commercial transaction," the prevailing
I be allowed a reasonable attorneyfee ifthe
party M
commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. Brower
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours d; Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d
345,349 (1990) . . . . Since Ward brought this action claiming a
breach of that contract, a "commercial transaction" was the
gravamen of this lawsuit. Thus, Ward is entitled to an award of
attorneyfees incurred on appeal pursuant to LC. 5 12-120(3).
E.g., Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,
869 P.2d 1365 (1994).
Ward, 128 Idaho at 370,913 P.2d at 586 (emphasis added).
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The holding in Ward is clear and applies with great force to the facts presented
here. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the award of attorneys' fees, pursuant to
Section 12-120(3), is a fundamental policy of the state of Idaho. That fundamental policy
applies to this case, in that the alleged employment agreement was the gravamen of all of
plaintiffs claims. As the Idaho appellate courts have recognized, a mandatory award of fees in
cases involving a contract relating to services under Section 12-120(3) is simply a "cost of using
the [Idaho] court system to resolve disputes" in specified types of actions. De Wils, 106 Idaho at
291,678 P.2d at 83; Sanders, 134 Idaho at 325, 1 P.3d at 828. And, the Idaho courts have found
nothing punitive about a mandatory fee award under Section 12-120(3). Id. Indeed, over twenty
years ago, the Idaho Supreme Court cautioned litigants who are looking to file suit in Idaho in a
case involving the specified causes of action set forth in Section 12-120(3), and admonished
would-he litigants to evaluate the merits of their claims or defenses carefully before filing an
action involving a commercial dispute. Why? Because "[tlhere is a direct relationship between
a party's decision to litigate a commercial dispute and the benefits or costs which flow from that
decision." De Wils, 106 Idaho at 293.
Presumably, Mr. Gray performed such an evaluation before he filed this suit, or at
least when he chose to oppose defendant Tri-Way's initial Motion to Dismiss, which argued that
this matter should properly have been brought in Washington. Mr. Gray's insistence that Idaho
was the proper forum, and that its law should apply, further supports the policy in favor of
applying the mandatory attorney fee provisions of Section 12-120(3). Mr. Gray also specifically
prayed for attorney fees pursuant to Section 12-120(3) in his Complaint and Amended
Complaint, further acknowledging its applicability in this matter.

-
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In addition, as the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged in Ward, the strength of
Idaho's policy of allowing attorneys' fees in those types of cases specified in the statute is
paramount and applies even where the substantive claims in this case are governed by the law of
another jurisdiction. See Ward, 128 Idaho at 370,913 P.2d at 586. When read together, the
cases of Ward, Sanders, and DeWils illustrate that, for cases involving those causes of action
specified under Section 12-120(3), the Idaho courts view a mandatory award of attorneys' fees as
part and parcel with litigating a contract case in Idaho. After all, a party who chooses to litigate
in Idaho necessarily generates attorneys' fees in Idaho and uses the time and resources of the
Idaho courts, which impacts chambers, its staff, the clerk of the court, and other court personnel.
This is simply another way of articulating why Section 12-120(3) is a "cost of using the [Idaho]
court system" as stated in the DeWils and Sanders cases. Accordingly, Idaho has a strong
interest in ensuring that Section 12-120(3) governs the award of attorneys' fees. This principle is
woven into the fabric of the Idaho authorities addressed above and applies with great force to the
facts presented here.
Finally, the award of attorneys' fees in cases involving contracts specified under
Section 12-120(3) has been the law in Idaho for decades. Section 12-120(3) unequivocally
provides that "the prevailing party

be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee" in cases

involving a commercial transaction. This language is mandatory, unavoidable, and emphatic.
To be sure, Section 12-120(3) is not a default provision or gap filler, subject to override by the
parties in cases involving contracts that relate to services. Rather, it represents a basic and
fundamental policy choice by the State of Idaho that, for cases involving such contracts, an
award of attorneys' fees is mandatory. In fact, one could easily speculate that a substantial factor
in Mr. Gray choosing to file this suit in Idaho rather than Washington is because of the

-
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mandatory availability of attorneys' fees under Section 12-120(3). In light of the Idaho Court of
Appeals' twenty year old admonishment in DeWils that would be litigants should choose their
forum carefully because the "costs" of litigating commercial cases in Idaho will come in the
form of the award of fees under Section 12-120(3), taken together with plaintiffs
acknowledgment in his pleadings that Section 12-120(3) governs a fee award in this case,
plaintiff cannot now avoid the application of Section 12-120(3).
B.

Standards Governing an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under Idaho Code
Section 12-120(3).
The defendants seek an award of their attorneys' fees for their defense of

plaintiffs claims pursuant to Section 12-120(3), which provides:

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relatine to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law,
rite prevailing part)!shull be allowed a reasonable attorwqv'sfee
to be set by the Court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
(Emphasis added.)
As demonstrated below, the defendants are clearly the prevailing parties and this
action meets the criteria established by Section 12-120(3) for an award of attorney fees. As the
Supreme Court of Idaho has noted:
Under LC. 5 12-120(3), the prevailing party in a civil action
involving a commercial transaction is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorneys fees. There is a two-stage analysis necessary
to determine whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Fiust, the commercial
transaction must be integral to tire claim, and second,the
commercial transaction must provide the actual basis for
recovery. A commercial transaction means all transactions except
those for personal or household purposes.
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Iron Eagle Dev. LLC v. Quality Design Sys,, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,493,65 P.3d 509,515 (2003)
(citations omitted and emphasis added). Again, as stated above, though Iron Eagle Dev. LLC
dealt with the "commercial transaction" provision of Section 12-120(3), because the alleged
employment contract was one "relating to . . . services" as provided under the statute, the same
rationale employed by the Iron Eagle Court applies to this case as well.
Here, the entirety of plaintiffs action was based upon the purported employment
agreement. As such, the underlying contract was certainly "integral" to the various causes of
action, including those sounding in tort. The second element addressed by the Iron Eagle Court
is also present here, in that all theories of recovery asserted by plaintiff were based upon the
"terms" of the alleged employment agreement. Indeed, the contractual terms which plaintiff
sought to enforce represented the entirety of his damage claims, and thus the two-stage analysis
set forth above has been satisfied.
1.

The defendants are the prevailing parties in this action.

"The determination of whether a litigant is the prevailing party is committed to
R.
the discretion of the trial court." Sanders, 134 Idaho at 325, 1 P.3d at 826; see also IDAHO
Clv. P. 54(d)(l)(B). In Idaho, governing legal standards on the prevailing party issue are

provided by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). There are three principal factors the trial
court must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: "(1) the final judgment or
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues;
and (3) the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue or claim." J e r v Joseph C.L. U.
Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555,557,789 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1990). Importantly, under
Idaho law, "[a] determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is determined 'from an
overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis."' Vanderford v. Knudson, --- P.3d ---,
2007 WL

-

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 8

2012425, "10 (Idaho July 13,2007) (quoting Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v. Nord Excavating &
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005).
On August 7,2007, this Court issued its errata Order granting the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by Mr. Gray in this action. Moreover, on
September 12,2007, the Court entered a final Judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed
this case with prejudice, which included all of plaintiffs claims for relief against the defendants.
Accordingly, the final judgment and result obtained by the defendants in relation to the relief
sought overwhelmingly and exclusively favors the defendants. As the United States Supreme
Court has stated, "[rlespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
760, 107 S. Ct. 2672,96 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1987). Here, Mr. Gray received none of the relief sought
by way of his Amended Complaint, as final Judgment was entered in the defendants' favor.
Moreover, "in deciding whether a party was the prevailing one the inquiry is not
conducted motion-by-motion or argument-by-argument." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,
434, 111 P.3d 110, 119 (2005). Rather, the prevailing party determination is done from an
overall view. Eighteen Mile Ranch, 117 P.3d at 133. As demonstrated above, in analyzing the
prevailing party issue as a coherent whole, it is clear that the defendants are the prevailing party
in this action.'

' Although the defendants alleged a counterclaim against Mr. Gray, the defendants
stipulated and agreed to dismiss those counterclaims with prejudice in an effort to bring some
finality to this matter. Indeed, although the defendants agreed to dismiss their counterclaims,
they did so in order to effectuate an appeal or, in the event no such appeal was taken, to obtain
closure. As such, plaintiff did not "prevail" on the defendants' counterclaims.
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2.

The gravamen of this litigation is a contract of the type described in
Section 12-120(3).

In what is a familiar expression of Idaho law, to determine whether attorneys' fees
are available under Section 12-120(3), "[tlhe critical test is whether the [contract at issue]
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the [contract] must be integral to the claim and constitute
a basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Bingham v. Montane Res. Assoc., 133
Idaho 420,426,987 P.2d 1035,1041 (1999). There can be no doubt that the gravamen of this
lawsuit involves a contract of the type specified in Section 12-120(3). All of plaintiffs claimsincluding those allegations of fraud, constructive fraud, quantum meruit, implied contracts,
quasi-contracts, unjust enrichment or equitable estoppel-sought

to enforce or were otherwise

entirely based upon the terms of the alleged employment agreement andlor option to purchase
stock. As such, the alleged contracts were not simply the "gravamen" of the case, they were the
case, and defendants clearly prevailed on all counts.

3.

The defendants are entitled to all of their attorneys' fees incurred in
the defense of this action.

Defendants have fully detailed for the Court the scope and amounts of fees
claimed in this action by way of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed concurrently herewith.
Under Section 12-120(3) and controlling Idaho law, defendants submit that they are entitled to
an award of all of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of this action.
In a recent case involving the issue of the enforceability of an unsigned loan
commitment letter, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the attorneys' fees incurred by the
defendant bank in defending against claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith, and fvaud were recoverable under Section 12-120(3) because such
claims arose in the context of the underlying contract. See Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut 'I Ass 'n,
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141 Idaho 362,368-69, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110-11 (2005). Notably, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant bank could not recover attorneys' fees in defending against the fraud claim. Id. at 369,
109 P.3d at 1111. In rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "the fact is, all of
[plaintiffs] claims arise within the . . . context of [plaintiff] attempting to obtain a loan for his
business. The fraud claim is simply another aspect of [plaintiffs] claim that he purchased cattle
at the sale as a result of [the defendant bank's] representations. All of this is integral to the
[contract] between [the defendant bank] and [plaintiff]." Id.
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified its holding from Lettunich
stating:
From time to time the Court has denied fees under LC. 5 12-120(3)
on the commercial transaction ground either because the claim
sounded in tort or because no contract was involved. The
commercial transaction ground in Z.C. 8 12-IZO(3) neither
prohibits afee award-fora commercial transaction that involves
tortious conduct (see ~ettunichv. Key Bank Nat 7 Ass 'n, 141 Idaho
362,369, 109 P.3d 1104, 1111 (2005)), nor does it require that
there be a contract. Anv previous holdings to the contrary are
overruled. We hold that [plaintiff] is entitled to a fee award on
appeal with respect to his fraud claim, as he is seeking recovery of
damages sustained as a result of the commercial transaction
involved in this case.
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594,559-600 (2007) (emphasis
added). Thus, whether in the context of an underlying contract or a commercial transaction,
when the transaction at issue involves one of those transactions specified in Section 12-120(3),
the prevailing party's entitlement to attorney fees is mandatory, even if the underlying lawsuit is
based in part on a tort theory of recovery.
In light of Lettunich and Blimka, the defendants are entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees under Section 12-120(3) for all reasonable fees incurred in the defense of this
action. As demonstrated above, there can be no dispute that plaintiffs claims flow from the
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central issue in this case: his failed effort to enforce the Draft Employment Ageement and the
Draft Option to Purchase Stock. The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Lettunich applies with
equal force here because, the fact is, all of plaintiffs claims arise within the context of his
attempt to enforce a purported contract relating to services. See Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 369, 109
P.3d at 1111. The dismissal of plaintiffs claims for fraud and other equitable remedies are
simply alternative aspects of his more general complaint that the defendants wrongfully refused
to cornply with the terms of the underlying "contracts." As a result, the defendants are entitled to
an award of their attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the defense of such claims.
Finally, the Court's determination that there was no meeting of the minds
sufficient to form a binding contract does not alter the fact that plaintiffs pursued this action
under a contract theory. As such, plaintiff may not avoid the mandatory attorney fee provisions
of Section 12-120(3) simply by arguing that no valid contract was ever found to exist. To adopt
such a premise would render the statute illusory
itself under similar facts.
111.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendants respectfully request that the Court award
them their attorney fees in the amount set forth in their Memorandum of Costs and Fees.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2007.

,'

Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of September, 2007, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Erik F. Stidham
HOLLAND
& HARTLLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Facsimile (208) 343-8869

(,$US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

@ G. Murray
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Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Dean Arnold, ISB #6814
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys For PlaintiffIAppellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff/Appellant,
VS.

ROBERT GRAY'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY PETERSON, Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
an individual; GARY PETERSON, an
individual,

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., RAY ALLRAD, KATHY PETERSON, GARY PETERSON, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD: JASON MURRAY, OF THE FIRM MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK &
FIELDS, CHTD, 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., lOTH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 829, BOISE, IDAHO
83701-0829, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Robert Gray ("Gray"), hereby appeals the Order

entered by the Court on June 5, 2007 and subsequent Order Clarifying June 5, 2007 Summary

001 4.2
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Judgment Order and Correcting the Order on August 7, 2007, which was later reduced to
Judgment entered on September 12,2007, Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, presiding.
2.

Appellant Gray has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgment and Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule
1l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

Appellant intends to assert a number of issues on appeal including, but not limited

to, the following:
a.

the Trial Court erred granting of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment against all claims made by Plaintiff Rob Gray;

b.

the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for breach of contract
fails as a matter of law;

c.

the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's statutory claim for wages
fails as a matter of law;

d.

the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for promissory
estoppel fails as a matter of law;

e.

the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for equitable
estoppel/ quantum meruit fails as a matter of law;

f.

the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for fraud fails as a
matter of law.

Appellant reserves the right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the
issues set forth above.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Appellant requests the reporter's transcript,

6.

Appellant requests that all documents and pleadings in the Court file be included

in the clerk's record on appeal, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R.,
and specifically including all briefs and affidavits submitted by Appellant Gray in this matter.
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7.

The undersigned hereby certifies:
a.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

b.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

c.

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED this

a

@ day of October, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

BY

ham, of the firm
t
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Defendants.
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through his counsel of record, Holland &
Hart, LLP, and Defendant, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") both agree
to a one (1) week extension of time for Gray to object to Tri-Way's Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs.
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0
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through his counsel of record, Holland &
Hart, LLP, and Defendant, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") both agree
to extend the time for Gray to object to Tri-Way's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs.
The parties recognize that the original Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs served on
Gray on September 26, 2007 was incomplete. Tri-Way has now provided a complete
copy to Gray. The parties thereby stipulate to a further three (3) day extension of time

STIPULATION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO OBJECT TO MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - 1

001.48

for Gray to object to Tri-Way's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs such that Gray's
objection will be filed on or before October 25, 2007.
DATED this

214day of October, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

42r i/C
/

Erik F. Stidham. of the firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK &
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Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants are not entitled to the attorneys' fees which they seek. First, Defendants
should not be considered the "prevailing party" under Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) and Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants asserted six claims against Plaintiff Robert Gray
("Gray"). Of the six (6) claims, Defendants conceded at summary judgment that three (3) of
their claims against Gray were without factual or legal merit. Then Defendants dismissed the
remaining three (3) claims against Gray. In short, neither Defendants nor Gray should be
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considered the prevailing party given that none of the parties prevailed on any of the affirmative
claims.
Second, even if Defendants are considered to be prevailing parties, Defendants should not
recover all of the $64,359.19 in fees and costs they seek. The Court should equitably apportion
all fees and costs to reflect that Defendants' victory was only a partial victory. Moreover,
Defendants, even if they prevailed on a particular claim, may only recover fees for those claims
which were grounded in contract, and may not recover fees and costs for those claims which
were grounded in tort or based on statute. Also, Defendants should not be allowed to recover
fees related to unnecessary and meritless motions such as their unsuccessful motions to dismiss
based upon jurisdiction.
Finally, Defendants are not entitled to their discretionary costs because they failed to
provided sufficient evidentiary support justifying the costs and also failed to establish that this
case's costs were "exceptional" and the costs were reasonably incurred.

11.
A.

ARGUMENT

Defendants Are Not Prevailing Parties under Rule 54, and Thus, Are Not Entitled to
an Award of Fees and Costs.
The Court should deny Defendants' request for fees and costs in its entirety on the basis

that Defendants were not the prevailing party. Under both Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), which
authorizes an attorney fees in a civil action involving a commercial transaction based on a
contract, and Rule 54(d)(l)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes an award
of costs as a matter of right, the party seeking such fees and costs must first prove it qualifies as
"the prevailing party." Idaho Rule of Civil Produce 54(d)(l)(B) provides the framework for
determining the prevailing party issue for entitlement to both fees and costs, which states:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
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the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple
claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, crossclaims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and
the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or
claims.. .
Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), there are three principal factors the trial court must
consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed. First, the court must evaluate the final
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; second, whether there were multiple
claims or issues between the parties; and third, the extent to which each of the parties prevailed
on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,411-12,659 P.2d 160, 16566 (Ct.App. 1983). "The mandate of [Rule 541 is clear: The trial court is vested with the
discretion to apportion costs and fees, taking into account counterclaims, cross-claims or other
multiple issues." Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Idaho App.
1987).
For example, in .Jones, the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants for sums due on a
contract. The defendant counterclaimed for restitution of overpayment made to the plaintiffs in a
previous transaction. 112 Idaho at 887, 736 P.2d at 1341. The trial court found for the plaintiffs
on the contract claim, but reduced the plaintiffs' recovery by the amount of the overpayments.
Id. Based upon these facts, the trial court refused to find that either party prevailed for purposes
of awarding fees and costs, noting that the plaintiffs had prevailed on some claims and defendant
had prevailed on others. Id. at 889, 736 P.2d at 1343. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts decision: "We find no abuse of discretion in such decision. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A), which
authorizes costs to the prevailing party, and LC.

5 12-120(2), which authorizes attorney fees to a

prevailing party, are not applicable where, as here, there is no prevailing party." Id. at 889-890,
736 P.2d at 1343-1344.
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In Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1988), a pedestrian and her
husband brought action against an automobile driver for injuries sustained as a result of a motor
vehicle accident. At trial, the plaintiffs prevailed on the compensatory damages claim, but did
not prevail on the claims for loss of consortium and punitive damages. Id. Pursuant to Rule
54(d)(l), plaintiffs sought an award of costs. Id

The trial judge, however, determined that

although plaintiffs prevailed on the issue of compensatory damages, there was no overall
prevailing party within the meaning of the rule, and as such, plaintiffs were not entitled to an
award of costs. Id
Similarly, this case involved multiple claims and issues. Here, Plaintiff asserted a total of
eight claims against Defendants, including breach of contract, fraud, estoppel, and statutory wage
claim violations.

See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended

Complaint"). Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiff, asserting six claims, including breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage, defamation, tortious interference with contract, conversion, and quasi-estoppel. See
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, and Counterclaim. After engaging in
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court heard argument on
September 25,2006. At summary judgment, Defendants conceded that their claims for Tortious
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count 11), Defamation (Count 111) and
Quasi-Estoppel (Count VI) were without legal or factual support. See Order Denying in Part and
Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On June 5, 2007, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way. Nine days later, on June 14, 2007,
the Court entered a separate decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, granting it in
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part and denying it in part. See Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Shortly thereafter, Defendants dismissed the remainder of their

counterclaims, which were not already dismissed by the Court's prior decision. Neither party
recovered on any of their respective claims.
Stated differently, Gray can be said to have prevailed on six of the fourteen claims
asserted while Defendants can be said to have prevailed on eight of the fourteen claims asserted.
Taking into account the parties' proportional success on the multiple claims and issues, the Court

- under both Jones and Ruge - would be within its sound discretion to find that no party
prevailed, and that each party must bear its own costs. See Jones, 112 Idaho at 889-890, 736
P.2d at 1343-1344; Ruge, 114 Idaho at 892, 761 P.2d at 1244. Like the parties in Jones and

Ruge, both Plaintiff and Defendants in this case only prevailed on a fraction of their respective
claims. Therefore, the Court should find that Rule 54(d)(l)(A) and LC.

9

12-120(2), do not

apply here - where there is no prevailing party.
B.

Even Assuming Defendants Are Prevailing Parties, Defendants Are Not Entitled To
Recover Of All The Fees Sought.
1.

Fees and Costs Should Be Apportioned.

Even if the Court deems Defendants the "most" prevailing party, Defendants are not
entitled to the entire fee and cost award they have requested given that they did not prevail on a
significant portion of the total claims asserted. "Where parties have each prevailed on different
causes of action tried in the same lawsuit, attorney fees [and costs] may be apportioned
accordingly." Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 121, 626 P.2d 767,
777 (Idaho 1980) (citing Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978) and I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B)). See also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (Idaho Ct.App.
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1993); Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,835 P.2d 677 (Idaho App. 1992); Prouse v. Ransom, 117
Idaho 734,791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989).
In Badell, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of a seventy-five
percent attorney fee award where the court found that the plaintiff only prevailed in part. 122
Idaho at 450, 835 P.2d at 685 (Idaho Ct.App. 1992). Similarly, in Bumgarner, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to reduce the plaintiffs fee award by one-half to
reflect the fact that the plaintiff only prevailed on one of his trespass claims, which overlapped to
some extent with his other trespass claim, but was not successful on his emotional distress claim
and a separate trespass claim. 124 Idaho at 644, 862 P.2d at 336. See also Northwest Bee-Corp
v. Home Living Service,l36 Idaho 835,41 P.3d 263 (Idaho 2002)(affirming trial court's decision

to award defendant only one-half of attorneys' fees as a portion of her fees were incurred during
the preparation of her counterclaim upon which she did not prevail).
Application of this equitable rule to the present case should result in a pro-rata reduction
of Defendants' fee award for the claims on which Plaintiff prevailed. Here, each of the parties
has prevailed on different causes of action tried within the same lawsuit. Thus, attorney fees
should be apportioned accordingly in accordance with the prior decisions of Idaho courts. It
would certainly be within the Court's sound discretion to award Defendants no more than 60%
of the fees and costs requested, or $38,615.51, to reflect the fact that Defendants only prevailed
on eight of the fourteen claims asserted (approximately 60% of the claims). See Massey-

Ferguson, 102 Idaho at 121, 626 P.2d at 777; Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d at 336;
Badell, 122 Idaho at 450, 835 P.2d at 685.
2.

Fees Incurred On The Tort And Statutory Claims Mav Not Be Allowed.

In addition, Defendants are not entitled to fees incurred prosecuting and defending claims
grounded in tort andlor statutory violations. Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) does not authorize
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attorneys' fees for claims grounded in tort or statutory violations. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home

Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 (Idaho 2002); Prop. Mgmt. West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126
Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Idaho 1995). Accordingly, the attorneys' fees
claimed by Defendants must be apportioned to exclude the unrecoverable fees spent on the other
causes of action not grounded in a contract. Hunt, 126 Idaho at 899-900.
In Prop. Mgmt. West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 894 P.2d 130 (1995), the plaintiff sued
the defendant on a variety of theories after the defendant's employment relationship with the
plaintiff soured. A major issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in granting
attorney fees under I.C. (j 12-120(3) to plaintiff as the prevailing party on the claims. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not be awarded attorney fees on two of the claims
upon which it prevailed because, although the underlying relationship between the parties may
have been based on the defendant's employment with the plaintiff, those two claims were
grounded in tort, not in contract. Id. at 899-900, 894 P.2d at 132-33. C.J, Atwood v. W: Constr.,

Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479 (Ct.App.1996) (awarding attorney fees expended on
employment contract but disallowing fees expended on plaintiffs age discrimination claim
which was rooted in statute).
Just as the plaintiff in Hunt could not recover attorneys' fees expended on non-contract
based claims, Defendants should not be allowed to recover for fees incurred prosecuting and
defending claims grounded in tort and statutory violations. Plaintiff brought claims for fraud,
constructive fraud, and violations of Idaho's wage claim statutes.

Defendants asserted

counterclaims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation,
tortious interference with contract, and conversion. None of these foregoing claims pleaded by
the parties can be fairly said to be an action "on the contract" for purposes of Section 12-120(3).
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Thus, no contractual or statutory authority for an award of attorneys' fees exists on these seven
causes of action - which constitute one-half of the claims asserted: and Defendants' fee award
should be reduced accordingly.
Combining the numbers of claims on which Defendants did not prevail (the six
counterclaims) and the number of claims that are not contract-based (three in addition to the six
counterclaims), the Court should find nine claims for which Defendants would not be entitled to
be awarded fees and costs (assuming Defendants are even deemed the "prevailing party"). Thus,
subtracting those nine claims from the total of fourteen claims asserted, Defendants should only
receive fees incurred in relation to the five remaining claims as represented by a percentage of
the overall claims asserted, or a thirty-three percent fee award of $20,305.20'.
3.

Defendants Should Not Be Allowed to Recover Attorney Fees and Costs
Associated With Its Motion to Dismiss.

Furthermore, Defendants wrongfully seek fees and costs associated with their
unsuccessful motions to dismiss based upon jurisdiction. The Court clearly held that it had
jurisdiction over the Defendants. Defendants did not prevail on these arguments, and therefore
are not entitled to fees and costs associated with those arguments. Defendants incurred fees of
Accordingly,
$6,872.00 related to the meritless motion to dismiss based on lack of j~risdiction.~

' Note that the calculation excludes discretionary costs.
2

Attorney
Patricia
M. Olsson
Jason G.
Murray

Russell G.
Metcalf
TOTAL

] Dates
12/7/04, 12/15/04,2/15105,4/6/05,
4/25/05, 5/4/05, 5/16/05
12/8/04, 12/9/04, 12/16/04,2122/05,
2/23/05,3122/05,3128105,3~31105,
4/6/05,4/7/05,4/8/05,4/12/05,
4/25/05,5~2/05,5/3/05,5/4/05,
5/12/05,5/16/05,5/17/05,5/23/05
2/22/05,2/23/05,3/7/05,3/23/05,
3/24/05,9/7106, 9/8/06

Total
$1455.50
$3904.00

$1512.50

$6872.00
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the award to Defendants should be reduced by $6,872.00 to deduct the fees and costs associated
with their failed motions to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction.
C.

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Discretionary Costs Because It Cannot Show Such
Costs Were Necessary And Exceptional.
In general, an award of discretionary costs is "committed to the sound discretion of the

district court." Zimmerman v. V o l h a g e n ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 858, 920 P.2d 67, 74
(1996). However, the burden is on the prevailing party to make an adequate and initial showing
that discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934
P.2d 20 (1997); Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971
(1993), citing Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991).
Furthermore, it is important to note that even if a requested discretionary cost is necessary and
reasonable, if the Plaintiff fails to prove that the cost was not exceptional, the court must deny
the cost on that basis alone. See Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987
P.2d 1035 (1999); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492,493-94,960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1988); see also

lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,384,973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999).
Plaintiff objects to the Defendants claimed discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
54(d)(l)(D), which provides in relevant part, as follows:
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that
listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of
justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs,
shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost
should or should not be allowed....

Id.

.ss
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Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the Defendants' claimed discretionary costs described as
follows:
1.

Photocovying Imaging (1,353.23)

2.

Vendor Services ($177.00)

3.

Westlaw Research ($560.11)

4.

Out-of-Town Travel - devositions of G. Peterson. K. Peterson, and R. Allard
($647.15)

Defendants have made no showing that these discretionary costs "were necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against
[Plaintifq." There is no basis for the Court to find from the record that the additional sums
claimed by the Defendants fall within the category of exceptional costs. The Supreme Court has
approved, as a proper reading of the term "exceptional" in Rule 54(d)(l)(D), a trial court's denial
of expert witness fees, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys, and
photocopying charges on the ground that the use of such experts and other expenses are
commonly incurred in serious personal injury actions. Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d
175 (1998). The same rationale is applicable in this contract dispute action. Indeed, there is
nothing exceptional about the discretionary costs claimed by Defendants and Defendants make
no effort to prove otherwise. Because Defendants have not put forth any effort to justifl their
discretionary costs and nonetheless would be unable to do so, their request for such costs in the
amount of $2,828.29 should also be denied.

111.

CONCLUSION

To the extent Defendants only partially prevailed, the Court should either deny attorney
fees altogether or fairly apportion such fees and costs to the extent that each party prevailed. In
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addition, Defendants are not entitled to fees and costs incurred in the prosecution and defense of
non-contract based claims. Defendants are not entitled to any discretionary costs.
DATED this

day of October, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
Plaintiff,

RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONS TO RECORD

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY
PETERSON, an individual; GARY
PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants.

1
I

COME NOW the above-named defendantslrespondents, Tri-Way Construction
Services, Inc., Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, by and through undersigned
counsel, and request that, in addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28

RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO RECORD - 1

of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record on
Appeal:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on August 2, 2006;

2.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed on August 2,2006;
3.

Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed on August 2,2006;
4.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed on August 30,2006;
5.

Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed on August 30,2006;
6.

Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed on September 14,2006;
7.

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed on October 13,2006;

8.

Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum Re: Statute of Frauds,

filed on November 27,2006;

9.

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way, lodged on

10.

Order Clarifying June 5,2007 Summary Judgment Order and Correcting

June 5,2007;

the Order, lodged on August 7,2007; and
11.

Judgment, entered by the Court on September 12,2007.

-
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DefendantsIRespondents further request that the Exhibits to the Affidavits of
Jason G. Murray requested herein (Request Nos. 3 and 5, respectively) be filed as Exhibits to the
Clerk's Record in accordance with I.A.R. 31.
This Request for Additions to the Clerk's Record on Appeal is brought pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c), and is further supported by the Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in
Support of Request for Additions to Record, filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2007.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2007, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO
RECORD to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Erik F. Stidham
HOLLAND
&HARTLLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Facsimile (208) 343-8869

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(iY/~andDelivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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DEC 21
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

~WnYYvW

Bv

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ROBERT GRAY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVOC 0409193D
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

VS.
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., et al.
Defendants.

On June 5, 2007, the Court granted Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and the Petersons
collectively "Tri-Way") summary judgment on all of Robert Gray's claims and on August 9, 2007,
he Court clarified its Order Granting Summary Judgment to Tri-Way.
On June 11, 2007, the Court denied Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment on Tri-Way's
3ounterclaim as to the Counts I, IV and V of Tri-Way's Counterclaims finding there were disputes
)f material facts. As to Counts 11, 111, and VI, the Court dismissed those counterclaim counts. On
September 6, 2007, the parties stipulated to dismiss Tri-Way's remaining counterclaims. The Court
:ntered final judgment on September 12,2007. Gray appealed and on September 26,2007, Tri-Way
noved for costs and fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3) and I.C. 5 12-121. Gray opposed.
The Court scheduled argument for November 29, 2007. Gray's attorney failed to appear but
ater Gray's attorney filed an affidavit in which he testified that he had not received notice of the
learing.

The Court clerk contacted Gray's attorney and he indicated the Court could make its

lecision without further argument. Therefore, on December 20, 2007, the Court took the matter
inder advisement.
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Tri-Way's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees
md the Court awards Tri-Way attorney's fees in the amount of $48,207.75 and costs as a matter of
ight in the amount of $2,217.40. In an exercise of discretion, the Court denies Tri-Way any
liscretionary costs. By reference, the Court hereby incorporates the factual statement found in its
Irder Granting Summary Judgment to Tri-Way dated June 5,2007.
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ANALYSIS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

I/II
//
I1 II
I/

Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 91 1 P.2d 133 (1996); Owner-Operator Independent Drivers v. Idaho
Public Utilities Com h, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho
290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct.App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule") The party who claims attorney
fees must present the Court either a statute or contract between the parties permitting such an award;
if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract, attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v.

Fournier, 125 Idaho 789,74 P.2d 600 (Ct.App. 1994)

Tri-Way moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $3 12-120(3), 12-121 and
I/
10 1 II.R.C.P. 54. It contends it is the prevailing party. It further claims that the gravamen of the case was
11

a commercial transaction and that attorney's fees are proper under I.C. § 12-120(3). Gray timely'

12

objected to Tri-Way's memorandum of fees and costs. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6), 54(e)(6).

13 ( ( I .
14
15

11

TRI-WAY AND THE PETERSONS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTIES.
The Court finds Tri-Way and the Petersons are the prevailing parties. The determination as to

which party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho

16

784,787, 874 P.2d 595, 598 (Ct.App. 1994) (citing Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d

17

677, 685 (Ct.App.1992)). In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court first looks to

18

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(l) incorporates Rule 54(d)(l)(B) which provides in
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were
multiple claims, n~ultipleissues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or
other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims.

/ / S e e also Jerry J Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Associates v. Vuught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (CtApp.
26

Here, the Court granted summary judgment against Gray, dismissing all his claims and in

27

30
31

favor of Tri-Way. Gray succeeded on absolutely

/1

I

none of his claims. In fact, while the Court did

By stipulation, the parties extended the time for Gray to file his objection,
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iismiss three of Tri-Way's counterclaims, the Court denied Gray summary judgment against
rri-Way on the other three counterclaims. In determining which party prevailed in an action where
there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is "examined and determined from an overall
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v Nord Excavating & Paving,

lnc., 141 Idaho 716,719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). The Court is to view the overall success.
While the Court did dismiss three of Tri-Way's counterclaims, these were only a very small
part of this litigation. Tri-Way prevailed in defeating all of Gray's claims in which he requested past
and future loss of income, merit and longevity wages: reputation damages, treble damages on his
wage claim and restitution damages based on Tri-Way's alleged breach of contract. While the only
issue upon which Gray prevailed was the initial Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction, Gray cannot claim success; on the merits, Tri-Way clearly avoided liability. As the
Idaho Supreme Court opined:
In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money
judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no
worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense. . .

Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C., 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. Gray's victory in getting the three
cou~terclaimsdismissed3 does not outweigh Tri-Way's success against him on Gray's complaint and
had minimal effect on the overall case.
After a full consideration of the entire litigation, including the respective claims and defenses,
the Court is still of the view that Tri-Way and the Petersons are clearly the primary prevailing
parties. See Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152,968 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, the Court
finds, in an exercise ofits discretion, that Tri-Way and the Petersons are the prevailing parties in this
matter and are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a statute applies to their
request.

' Gray contended he was entitled to 50% of the net profits for the Arizona projects which for June 2004 to September 30,
2004 amounted to $271,792.48 in net profits.
>
The Court acknowledges that subsequent to the Court's decision, the parties stipulated to dismiss all of Tri-Way's
:ounterclaims but that does not change the Court's analysis.
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11.

TRI-WAY AND PETERSON ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER LC.
$12-120(3) ONLY FOR THOSE CLAIMS BASED ON THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT -- NOT THE WAGE CLAIM.

5 12-121(3) claiming the gravamen of the lawsuit
was a commercial transaction - Gray's alleged employment contract. I.C. 5 12-120(3) provides that
Tri-Way and Peterson claim fees under I.C.

the prevailing party in an action based upon "any commercial transaction" is entitled to recover
attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial transaction" as "all transactions except transactions
for personal or household purposes." The test for the application of this section is "whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to
recover." Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,776,890 P.2d 714,717 (1995).
The term "comn~ercialtransaction" is defined in I.C. §12-120(3) to mean "all transactions
except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, by the plain terms of the statute,
"[wlhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12120(3), . . . that claim triggers the application of the statute." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho
830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 (1995). However, there must also be a nexus between the commercial
transaction and the lawsuit:
[Tlhe award of attorney's fees [under 5 12-120(3) ] is not warranted every time a
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit.
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is
attempting to recover.

Id. quoting Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349
(1990). "Where a party alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction
under Idaho Code

5 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing

party may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Fritts v. Liddle
& Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, -, 158 P.3d 947,951 (2007).

In Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72,910 P.2d 744 (1996), the Court outlined the two
stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail itself of LC.

5

12-120(3):(1)

"there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim"; and (2) "the commercial
lransaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought." Brooks, 128 Idaho at 78, 910 P.2d at
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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750. That clearly exists here. The prevailing party in an action brought for breach of an employment
contract is entitled to an award of fees under I.C.

3

12-120(3), on the basis that-an employment

contract constitutes a contract for the purchase or sale of services under that statute. See Jenkins v.

Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, -, 108 P.3d 380, 391 (2005); Clark v. State, Dept. of Health
and Welfare, 134 Idaho 527,5 P.3d 988 (2000); Atwood v. Western Const. Inc., 129 Idaho 234,237,
923 P.2d 479,482 (Ct.App.1996).
Gray alleged the existence of an employment contract in his Complaint and claimed Tri-Way
and the Petersons breached that contract. Gray does not concedes that if the Court finds Tri-Way to
be the prevailing party, it would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees associated with defending
Gray's employment contract claims. However, Gray argues Tri-Way is not be entitled to attorney
fees associated with defending against the statutory claims he made pursuant to I.C.

5

45-612(2).

The Court agrees.
Former employers who prevail on a former employee's statutory claim for wages and treble
damages can not recover attorney fees under I.C.

5

12-120(3) for defending against the statutory

wage claim. Shay v. Cesler, 977 P.2d 199, 132 Idaho 585 (1999). The wage claim statute's attorney
fees provision for prevailing employers is the exclusive code section under which former employers
could recover attorney fees. I.C. 5 45-612(2); Id. The Idaho Supreme Court clearly ruled that I.C. 5
12-120(3) is not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage claim disputes. See Polk v.

Larrabee, 17 P.3d 247, 135 Idaho 303 (2000).
Therefore, when various statutory and common law claims are separable, the court should
bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to I.C.

5 12-120(3) only on the commercial transaction.

See Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002); Brooks v. Gigray
Ranches Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77-79, 910 P.2d 744, 749-51 (1996); Atwood v. Western Const., Inc.,
129 Idaho 234,241,923 P.2d 479,486 (Ct.App.1996).
111.

ATTORNEYS PEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $48,207.75 ARE REASONABLE.
Tri-Way seeks an award of $58,818.50 in attorney fees. Gray contests the reasonableness of

these attorney fees, and contends the Court should apportion those fees if the Court finds Tri-Way
was the prevailing party. The Court agrees.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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1

Determining whether the amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's

2

sound discretion. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc v Sbonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct.App.

3

1985). Rule 54 provides the criteria courts must consider in awarding attorney's fees. Rule 54(e)(3)

4

provides that the Court should consider the follow factors in determining the amount of such fees:

5

(A)

The time and labor required.

6

(B)

The novelty and difficulty of the questions.

7

(C)

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.

(D)

The prevailing charges for like work.

(E)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(F)

The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.

(G)
(H)

The amount involved and the results obtained.

8
9
10
11
12
13

The undesirability ofthe case.
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

14

(I)
(J)

15

(K)

The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's
case.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Awards in similar cases.

Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
(L)
In arriving at its decision, the Court applied all the required factors lo determine whether the claimed
fees were reasonable.
Among other things, the Court notes the fees were neither fixed nor contingent; they were
hourly. The Court finds that the hourly fees are reasonable and reflect the prevailing rate. This case
was hard fought. It stems from a business relationship gone sour. Furthermore, the law was complex
and, more importantly, determining what facts were relevant and material was complicated.
Therefore, the Court finds the issues in this case deserved more time than might normally be
associated with a case. Moreover the circumstances of the case drove the fees.
With respect to the actual fees, the Court carefully reviewed all the fees. With respect to any
fees associated with the Motion to Dismiss or the statutory wage claim, the Court denies those fees.
Tri-Way provided detailed billings that allowed the Court to reduce the fees by those fees associated
with the unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and those associated with the

30
31
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statutory claim. The Court further reduced the fees to reflect the fact the Court finds Tri-Way and the
Petersons to have prevailed on 95% of the claims associated with defending against the employment
contract. The Court notes that this was not hard to do, because the billings attached to Mr. Murray's
affidavit were very detailed and the time spent on the Motion to Dismiss and wage claims were
clearly delineated. The rest of the time and labor was reasonable. Based on the Court's review the
Court finds that the amount of $48,207.75 is fair and reasonable.
The Court, in an exercise of discretion and based upon the totality of the case, therefore
awards Tri-Way $48,207.75, and finds that this is the most equitable method of apportionment.

IV.

THE COURT GRANTS TRI-WAY NON-DISCRETIONARY COSTS.
Rule 54(d)(l)(C), I.R.C.P., governs awards of costs as a matter of right to the prevailing party.

Tri-Way claims $2,217.40 for non-discretionary costs and Gray did not object. After reviewing the
amounts claimed, the Court finds they fit within the rule and the Court awards Tri-Way these costs as a
matter of right.

V.

THE COURT DENIES TRI-WAY DISCRETIONARY COSTS.
Tri-Way also moves for an award of discretionary costs, for postage, facsimiles, photocopies

and out of town depositions in the amount $2,828.29, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Court
recognizes this issue as one of discretion. Although these costs may be reasonable and justified, the
Court cannot find that these costs are "exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule. Postage,
facsimile, deposition travel costs and photocopying costs are the commonplace and everyday
expenses of practicing law. There is no evidence that any of these costs are exceptional.
Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court denies discretionary costs to Tri-Way.

ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Tri-Way's Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees is hereby GRANTED and Tri-Way and the Petersons are awarded attorney's fees in the amount
of $48,207.75 and costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,217.40.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 21" day of December 2007,

u c .&
Cheri C. Copsey
District ~ u d g e
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3
4

5

I hereby certify that on this2)
-day of December 2007, I mailed (semd) a true and correc
copy of the within instrument to:

6
8

9

ERIK I?. STIDHAM
HOLLAND & HART LLP
P.O. BOX 2527
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2527

10
PATRICIA M. OLSSON
JASON G. MURRAY
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD.
P . 0 BOX 829
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Dean Arnold, ISB #6814
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869
Attorneys For PlaintiffIAppellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Case No. CV OC 0409193D
PlaintifflAppellant,
ROBERT GRAY'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
TNC., a Washington Corporation; RAY
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY PETERSON, Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
an individual; GARY PETERSON, an
individual,

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
INC., RAY ALLRAD, KATHY PETERSON, GARY PETERSON, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD: JASON MURRAY, OF THE FIRM MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK &
FIELDS, CHTD, 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., lOTH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 829, BOISE, IDAHO
83701-0829. AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

1.

The above-named Appellant, Robert Gray ("Gray"), hereby appeals the Order

Granting Attorneys' Fees and Costs entered by the Court on December 21, 2007, Hon. Cheri C.
Copsey, presiding.
2.

Appellant Gray has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgment and Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule
1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

Appellant intends to assert a number of issues on appeal relating to the award of

attorneys' fees including, but not limited to, the following:
a.

the Trial Court erred in determining that Defendants were entitled to
attorneys fees as the prevailing party pursuant to 3 12-120(3);

b.

the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney fees in the amount of
$48,207.75.

Appellant reserves the right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the
issues set forth above.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Appellant requests that all documents and pleadings relating to the award of

attorney fees be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in addition to those automatically
included under Rule 28 I.A.R., and specifically including all briefs and affidavits submitted by
Appellant Gray and Defendants in this matter relating to the award of attorneys' fees.
Defendants Motion for Attorney Fees
Defendants Memorandum of Costs and Fees
Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs
and Fees
Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Object to Motion for Attorneys Fees

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs
Notice of Hearing on Defendants Motion for Attorney Fees
Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing
Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing
Order Granting Costs and Attorney Fees

6.

The undersigned hereby certifies:
a.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

b.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

c.

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED this

11-

day of January, 2008.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

BY

-

Erik F. Stidham. of the firm
Attorneys for plaintiff ~ o b e rGray
t

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

72

I hereby certify that on this [Qday of January 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Jason G. Murray, Esq.
MOFFATT
THOMAS
BARRETT
ROCK
&FIELDS,CHTD.
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829
Fax: (208) 385-5384

[Z1
[Z1

G

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax)

fgr HOLLAND & HART LLP

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 34666
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.,
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual;
GARY PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants-Respondents.

1

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do liereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:
1. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees,
filed September 26,2007.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
August 2,2006.
2. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed August 2,2006.
3. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
August 3,2006.
4. Affidaivt of Robert Gray in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
August 3,2006.
5. Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed August 3,2006.
6. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed August 30,2006.
CERTIFICATE OF EXIllBITS

7. Affidaivt of Robert Gray in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed August 30,2006.
8. Affidavit of Scott E. Randolph in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 30,2006.
9. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
August 30,2006.
10. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed August 30,2006.
11. Robert Gray's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
September 13,2006.
12. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
September 14,2006.
13. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed October 13,2006.
14. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re
Statute of Frauds, filed November 13,2006.
15. Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees, filed September 26,2007.
16. Affidaivt of Erik F. Stidham Regarding Attomeys' Fees Hearing, filed
November 29,2007.
17. Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing, filed
November 29,2007.

LN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 24thday of January, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 34666
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VS.

TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.,
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual;
GARY PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
ERIK F. STIDHAM

JASON G. MURRAY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Date of Service:

FEE3 f 2 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ROBERT GRAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 34666
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.,
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual;
GARY PETERSON, an individual,
Defendants-Respondents.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
15'" day of October, 2007.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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Deputy Clerk
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